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1. Introduction
Important financial markets, such as EURONEXT or NASDAQ, rely on a discriminatory
limit-order book to balance supply and demand. The book gathers the limit orders
placed by market makers; each limit order allows one to buy or sell at a prespecified
price any volume of shares up to a prespecified limit. Any upcoming order is matched
with the best offers available in the book. Pricing is discriminatory, in the sense that each
market maker is paid according to the price he quoted for a given volume of shares. This
paper contributes to the study of price formation in limit-order markets.
An important obstacle to trade on such markets is that market makers may face an
insider with superior information about the value of the traded asset. This makes them
reluctant to sell, as they suspect that this value is likely to be high when the asset is
in high demand. To alleviate adverse selection, market makers can place collections
of limit orders or, equivalently, post tariffs that are convex in the traded volume. The
insider then hits the resulting limit-order book with a market order that reflects her pri-
vate information, paying a higher price at the margin for a higher volume of shares. The
problem of price formation thus amounts to characterizing the tariffs posted by market
makers in anticipation of the insider’s trading strategy.
In an influential article, Biais et al. (2000) tackle this problem in a model where
strategic market makers face a risk-averse insider who has private but imperfect in-
formation about the value of an asset, and, thus, has both informational and hedging
motives for trade. Assuming that the insider’s valuation for the asset has a continuous
distribution, they exhibit a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which market mak-
ers post strictly convex tariffs that may be interpreted as infinite collections of infinites-
imal limit orders. Market makers earn strictly positive expected profits in equilibrium.
Back and Baruch (2013) consider a slightly different game in which market makers are
restricted to posting convex tariffs. Using a different method, they identify the same
symmetric equilibrium tariffs as Biais et al. (2000).
In contrast to these results, Attar et al. (2014) argue that strategic competition be-
tween uninformed market makers may cause a breakdown of discriminatory markets.
To make this point, they consider a general model of trade in which several sellers com-
pete in menus of contracts to serve a buyer whose private information, or type, has a bi-
nary distribution. In this context, they show that in any pure-strategy equilibrium, one
type can trade only if the other type is driven out of the market, an outcome reminiscent
of Akerlof (1970). Each seller earns zero expected profit in equilibrium, and equilibria
can be sustained by linear tariffs. A pure-strategy equilibrium fails to exist whenever the
two buyer’s types have sufficiently close preferences.
The heterogeneity of these findings constitutes a puzzle: the equilibrium predictions
of competitive nonlinear-pricing models seem to dramatically depend on the assump-
tions made on the distribution of the insider’s private information. A natural question
is whether there is something special about the continuous-type case or the two-type
case that would explain their contrasting implications. The objective of this paper is to
clarify the origin of this puzzle and to outline possible solutions.
To this end, we set up a general model of the discriminatory limit-order book allow-
ing for nonparametric specifications of preferences and arbitrary discrete distributions
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for the insider’s type. We exploit the richness of this framework, which embeds the two-
type model of Attar et al. (2014) as a special case, to investigate the extent to which trade
takes place in equilibrium when the number of types grows large. To capture the func-
tioning of a discriminatory limit-order book, we focus on equilibria in which market
makers post convex tariffs, which can be interpreted as collections of limit orders. As for
deviations, we consider two scenarios. In the arbitrary-tariff game, market makers can
post arbitrary tariffs, as in Biais et al. (2000). This represents a situation in which side
trades can take place outside the book, as is the case if market makers can also place
fill-or-kill orders or make side trades on dark pools.1 In the convex-tariff game, market
makers can only post convex tariffs, as in Back and Baruch (2013). This represents a
situation in which all trades must take place through the book, as is the case if market
makers are restricted to placing collections of limit orders.
Our main finding is that in both games, adverse selection severely restricts equi-
librium outcomes. First, pure-strategy equilibria with convex tariffs in fact feature
linear pricing, in contrast to the equilibria with strictly convex tariffs obtained in
continuous-type models. Second, such linear-pricing equilibria essentially exist only in
the knife-edge private-value case where there is no adverse selection and market mak-
ers’ marginal cost is constant. In all other cases, pure-strategy equilibria typically fail to
exist when there are sufficiently many types. Indeed, any candidate equilibrium is such
that all types who trade do so at the same marginal cost for the market makers, a prop-
erty that is increasingly difficult to satisfy when the number of types grows large. These
results hold irrespective of the distribution of types as long as it remains discrete, both
in the arbitrary-tariff game and, in the absence of wealth effects, in the convex-tariff
game. In addition, in the arbitrary-tariff game, they extend to the case where the market
makers have strictly convex order-handling costs, even under private values.
The proof of these results proceeds by necessary conditions. That is, we assume that
a pure-strategy equilibrium with convex tariffs exists and we investigate its properties.
The logical structure of our argument can be broken down into four steps.
Indirect utilities We first notice that, fixing the convex tariffs posted in equilibrium by
all but one market maker, the preferences of the insider over the trades she can make
with this market maker exhibit a fair amount of regularity. In particular, the correspond-
ing indirect utility functions for the different insider’s types satisfy weak quasiconcav-
ity and weak single-crossing properties. This allows us to use standard mechanism-
design techniques (in the arbitrary-tariff game) or standard price-theory arguments (in
the convex-tariff game) to analyze the equilibrium best response of each market maker.
Linear pricing Although the weak single-crossing property does not guarantee that the
quantity purchased by the insider from any given market maker is nondecreasing in her
type, it does ensure that she always has a best response that satisfies this property. We
show that this implies that each market maker can break ties in his favor as long as he
sticks to nondecreasing quantities. Such ties, expressed in terms of the insider’s indi-
rect utility functions, play a key role in our discrete-type model; this reflects that no
1A fill-or-kill order must be entirely executed or else it is cancelled; thus, unlike for limit orders, partial
execution is not feasible. A dark pool is a trading platform in which trades take place over the counter.
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market maker can be indispensable for providing the insider with her aggregate equilib-
rium trades. Under competition, a remarkable consequence of this tie-breaking result
is that any pure-strategy equilibrium with convex tariffs and nondecreasing individual
quantities must feature linear pricing. In the arbitrary-tariff game, this linear-pricing re-
sult requires surprisingly little structure on the market makers’ profit functions. Still, a
key ingredient is that the set of types is discrete, because this discreteness allows for a
precise targeting of individual types and drives the impossibility of a market maker be-
ing indispensable. Another important geometric observation is that binding incentive
constraints cannot be reconciled with convex pricing when the insider’s preferences are
strictly convex; in particular, a monopoly would never want to post a convex tariff. Con-
vex pricing may occur only when competing market makers post linear tariffs, thereby
making indirect utility functions locally linear.
Market breakdown The second step of the argument focuses on equilibria with lin-
ear tariffs and nondecreasing individual quantities. We show that, except in the above-
mentioned pure private-value case, such equilibria exhibit an extreme form of market
breakdown. For instance, in the pure common-value case where the market makers’
marginal cost is strictly increasing in the insider’s type, only the highest type can trade
in equilibrium, reflecting that each market maker has an incentive to reduce his sup-
ply at the equilibrium price by placing an appropriate limit order. Equilibria with linear
tariffs and nondecreasing individual quantities then only exist under exceptional cir-
cumstances. Indeed, all types except the highest one must not be willing to trade at
the equilibrium price; however, this is unlikely to be the case when some types have
preferences close to the highest one’s, as when we let the number of types grow large
so as to approximate an interval. This proves our main results for the special case of
pure-strategy equilibria with nondecreasing individual quantities.
Other equilibrium outcomes The argument so far focuses on a subset of equilibria,
hence leaving open the possibility that equilibria that do not feature nondecreasing in-
dividual quantities may exhibit very different properties. To complete the argument, we
show that the restriction to nondecreasing individual quantities is actually innocuous.
Specifically, we prove that for a large class of profit functions, any pure-strategy equi-
librium with convex tariffs can be turned into another equilibrium with the same tariffs
and the same expected profits for the market makers, but now with nondecreasing indi-
vidual quantities. Key to this result is that, for a given profile of convex tariffs, allocations
with nondecreasing individual quantities achieve efficient risk sharing among market
makers.
The upshot of our analysis, therefore, is that the structure of pure-strategy equilib-
ria in arbitrary discrete-type models is qualitatively different from that arising in the
continuous-type models of Biais et al. (2000) and Back and Baruch (2013). When such
equilibria exist, market breakdown emerges as a robust prediction of competitive non-
linear pricing in limit-order markets. We complement the above analysis by providing
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure-strategy equilibria. These
conditions are eventually violated in the pure common-value case when we approxi-
mate a continuous set of types by an increasing sequence of discrete sets of types. As a
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result, the equilibrium correspondence fails to be lower hemicontinuous when we move
from discrete-type models to continuous-type models. This confirms and extends in a
radical way the results obtained by Attar et al. (2014) in the two-type case.
To overcome this tension between discrete- and continuous-type models, we relax
the equilibrium concept by exploring ε-equilibria of the arbitrary-tariff game in two lim-
iting cases of our analysis.
We first examine what happens when the number K of market makers grows large,
holding the number of types fixed. We prove that there exists an ε-equilibrium of the
arbitrary-tariff game, with ε on the order of 1/K2, that implements the allocation put
forward by Glosten (1994). This allocation is competitive in the sense that each marginal
quantity is priced at the expected cost of serving the types who purchase it; moreover,
it can be implemented by an entry-proof tariff. The intuition for the result is that if
K − 1 market makers each contribute to providing a fraction 1/K of this tariff, then the
resulting aggregate tariff is almost entry-proof from the perspective of the remaining
market maker.
We then explore the dual scenario in which the number I of types grows large, hold-
ing the number of market makers fixed. We prove that there exists an ε-equilibrium
of the arbitrary-tariff game, with ε on the order of 1/I, that implements the Biais et al.
(2000) allocation. The intuition for the result is that if K − 1 market makers each post
the strictly convex tariff that arises in the symmetric equilibrium characterized by Biais
et al. (2000), the same tariff is an approximate best response for the remaining mar-
ket maker in the discrete-type model when I is large enough. Mathematically, this is
because each market maker’s equilibrium expected profit in the continuous-type model
can be, up to terms of order 1/I, approximated in the Riemann sense by the correspond-
ing expected profit in the discrete-type model. Thus, although no sequence of exact
equilibria of discrete-type models converges to the Biais et al. (2000) equilibrium, lower
hemicontinuity is restored when we broaden the scope of the analysis to ε-equilibria.
Related literature
It is by now standard to represent trade in a limit-order market as implemented by an
auction mechanism in which traders submit orders, to be matched by trading platforms.
A uniform limit-order book, where all orders are executed at the market clearing price,
can thus be modeled as a uniform-price auction in which traders simultaneously post
supply functions. Characterizations of the corresponding supply-function equilibria
are provided by Grossman (1981), Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Kyle (1989), and Vives
(2011). We instead focus on discriminatory auctions, in which all the limit orders reach-
ing the book must be executed at their prespecified prices. Our setting also differs from
models of Treasury-bill auctions, in which it is typically assumed that bidders hold pri-
vate information, as in Wilson (1979) or Back and Zender (1993).
Many theoretical analyses of limit-order markets focus on the evolution of the book
as new traders arrive on the market; we refer to Parlour and Seppi (2008) for a useful sur-
vey. In comparison, fewer attempts have been made at understanding the competitive
forces leading to aggregate market outcomes. In an important article, Glosten (1994)
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proposes a candidate nonlinear tariff, meant to describe the limit-order book as a whole
and that specifies that any additional share beyond any given volume can be bought at
a price equal to the expected value of the asset conditional on demand being at least
equal to this volume. This tariff is convex, as demand typically increases when the in-
sider has more favorable information, and it yields zero expected profit to the market
makers. Moreover, this is the only convex tariff that is robust to entry, in the sense that
no uninformed market maker can gain by proposing additional trades to the insider on
top of those the tariff makes available.
As acknowledged in Glosten (1998), however, a natural question is whether this tar-
iff can be sustained in an equilibrium of a trading game with strategic market makers.
This approach has been pursued by Biais et al. (2000, 2013), Back and Baruch (2013),
and Attar et al. (2014). From a methodological viewpoint, these articles contribute to
the theory of nonexclusive competition under adverse selection, an issue first explored
by Pauly (1974), Jaynes (1978), and Hellwig (1988) in the context of insurance markets.
We make a further step in this direction by providing a general strategic analysis of the
discrete-type model and by exploring its implications in the limit when the number of
market makers or the number of possible types grows large.
Our results allow us to draw a sharp comparison with standard exclusive-compe-
tition models of adverse selection, such as Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976). First, the lack
of lower hemicontinuity of the pure-strategy-equilibrium correspondence we highlight
is intrinsically tied to the nonexclusive nature of competition. Indeed, lower hemicon-
tinuity is vacuously satisfied under exclusive competition: as in our model, necessary
conditions for the existence of pure-strategy equilibria become increasingly restrictive
when we increase the number of types and, in the continuous-type limit, no pure-
strategy equilibrium exists, as shown by Riley (1985, 2001). Second, we exploit the prop-
erty that the Glosten (1994) allocation can be implemented by an entry-proof tariff to
construct ε-equilibria when there are many market makers. This result has no counter-
part under exclusive competition, because a pure-strategy equilibrium then fails to exist
precisely when the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) allocation is not entry-proof, indepen-
dently of the number of competing firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 states our
main results. Section 4 establishes that pure-strategy equilibria with convex tariffs and
nondecreasing individual quantities feature linear pricing. Section 5 shows that such
equilibria exist only in exceptional cases when there is adverse selection or when mar-
ket makers have strictly convex costs. Section 6 extends these results to all equilibria
with convex tariffs, completing the proof of our main results. Section 7 offers neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Section 8
discusses how to interpret our results and relate them to the literature. Section 9 con-
siders ε-equilibria in the competitive and continuous limits of the model. Section 10
concludes. Proofs not given in the text can be found in the Appendix and, for technical
lemmas, in the Supplemental Material, available in supplementary file on the journal
website, http://econtheory.org/supp/2708/supplement.pdf.
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2. The model
Our model features a privately informed insider who can trade an asset with several mar-
ket makers. Unless otherwise stated, we allow for general payoff functions and arbitrary
discrete distributions for the insider’s type.
2.1 The insider
Because shares are homogeneous, the insider cares only about the aggregate quantity
Q she purchases from the market makers and the aggregate transfer T she makes in
return. Following Back and Baruch (2013) and Biais et al. (2013), we focus on the ask
side of the market and thus require that Q be nonnegative. The insider (she) is privately
informed of her preferences. Her type i can take a finite number I ≥ 1 of values with
strictly positive probabilities mi. Type i’s preferences over aggregate trades (QT) are
represented by a utility function Ui(QT) that is continuous and strictly quasiconcave
in (QT) and strictly decreasing in T . The following strict single-crossing property (Mil-
grom and Shannon 1994) is the key determinant of the insider’s behavior.
Assumption SC-U . For all i < j, Q<Q′, T , and T ′,
Ui(QT) ≤Ui
(
Q′T ′
)
implies Uj(QT) <Uj
(
Q′T ′
)

In words, a higher type is more willing to increase her purchases than are lower types.
As an illustration, consider the demand of type i at price p:
Di(p) ≡ arg max
{
Ui(QpQ) : Q ∈R+ ∪ {∞}
}

The continuity and strict quasiconcavity of Ui ensure that Di(p) is uniquely defined
and continuous in p. Moreover, Assumption SC-U implies that, for each p, Di(p) is
nondecreasing in i. To avoid discussing knife-edge cases involving kinks, we strengthen
this property by requiring that demand be strictly increasing in the insider’s type, in the
following sense.
Assumption ID-U . For all i < j and p,
0 <Di(p) < ∞ implies Di(p) <Dj(p)
A sufficient condition for Assumptions SC-U and ID-U to hold is that the marginal
rate of substitution τi(QT) of shares for transfers be well defined and strictly increasing
in i for all (QT). Assumptions SC-U and ID-U are maintained throughout the paper.
Some of our results are valid for such general utility functions, allowing for wealth
effects (Theorem 1). Others rely on quasilinearity (Theorem 2), though not on any par-
ticular parametrization of the insider’s utility function. The corresponding assumption
is as follows.
Assumption QL-U . The insider has quasilinear utility Ui(QT) ≡ ui(Q) − T , where
ui(Q) is differentiable and strictly concave in Q.
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Under this additional assumption, Assumptions SC-U and ID-U require only that
the derivative u′i(Q) be strictly increasing in i for all Q. For instance, in Biais et al. (2000),
Ui(QT) ≡ θiQ − (ασ2/2)Q2 − T , reflecting that the insider has constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) utility with absolute risk aversion α and faces residual Gaussian risk
with variance σ2. Assumptions SC-U and ID-U then hold if θi is strictly increasing in i.
In this case, the insider’s demand is independent of her wealth, as in Glosten (1994) and
Back and Baruch (2013).
2.2 The market makers
There are K ≥ 2 market makers. Each market maker (he) only cares about the quantity
q that he provides to the insider and the transfer t he receives in return. Again, we fo-
cus on the ask side of the market and thus require that q be nonnegative. Market maker
k’s preferences over trades (q t) with type i are represented by a profit function vki (q t)
that is continuous and weakly quasiconcave in (q t) and strictly increasing in t. In the
common-value case, the profit from a trade depends on the insider’s type, as in Glosten
and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Glosten (1994), or Biais et al. (2000). This contrasts
with the private-value case, in which the profit from a trade is independent of the in-
sider’s type. We allow for both cases by requiring that each market maker weakly prefer
to increase his sales to lower types than to higher types.
Assumption SC-v. For all k, i < j, q < q′, t, and t ′,
vki (q t) ≥ vki
(
q′ t ′
)
implies vkj (q t)≥ vkj
(
q′ t ′
)

Assumption SC-v is maintained throughout the paper. Assumptions SC-U and SC-
v imply that an insider with a higher type is willing to purchase more shares but faces
market makers who are weakly more reluctant to serve him. Our model thus typically
features adverse selection, with private values as a limiting case.
Some of our results are valid for such general profit functions, allowing for risk aver-
sion and inventory costs, as in Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983). Others require
more structure, notably in the form of quasilinearity and symmetry assumptions (The-
orems 1 and 2). First, we may follow Glosten (1994), Biais et al. (2000), and Back and
Baruch (2013) and assume that market makers have identical linear profit functions.
The corresponding assumption is as follows.
Assumption L-v. For each i, each market maker k earns a profit vki (q t) ≡ t − ciq when
he trades (q t) with type i, where ci is the strictly positive cost of serving type i.
Here, the market makers are assumed to be risk-neutral and ci may be thought of as
the expected liquidation value of the asset when the insider is of type i. Assumption SC-
v then amounts to imposing that cj ≥ ci when j > i, reflecting that market makers are
less willing to sell the asset when they know that its liquidation value is likely to be high.
Alternatively, we may follow Roll (1984) and assume that each market maker incurs a
strictly increasing and strictly convex order-handling cost when selling shares. The cor-
responding assumption is as follows.
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Assumption C-v. For each i, each market maker k earns a profit vki (q t) ≡ t − ci(q)
when he trades (q t) with type i, where the cost ci(q) is strictly convex in q, with ci(0) ≡ 0.
Assumption SC-v then amounts to imposing that ∂−cj(q′) ≥ ∂+ci(q) when j > i and
q′ > q.2  Assumption C-v generalizes Roll (1984) by allowing for both order-handling and
adverse-selection costs.
We state our main results for the case where the market makers’ profit functions
satisfy Assumption L-v or Assumption C-v (Theorems 1 and 2). We, however, indicate in
the course of the formal analysis the extent to which some of our results can be extended
to more general and possibly heterogenous profit functions.
2.3 Timing and strategies
The game unfolds as follows:
Stage 1. The market makers k = 1    K simultaneously post tariffs tk. Each tariff tk
is defined over a domain Ak ⊂R+ that contains 0, with tk(0) ≡ 0.
Stage 2. After privately learning her type, the insider purchases a quantity qk ∈ Ak
from each market maker k, for which she pays in total
∑
k t
k(qk).
A pure strategy s for the insider maps any tariff profile (t1     tK) and any type i into a
quantity profile (q1     qK). To ensure that type i’s problem,
max
{
Ui
(∑
k
qk
∑
k
tk
(
qk
)) : (q1     qK) ∈A1 × · · · ×AK
}
 (1)
always has a solution, we require that the domains Ak be compact and that each tariff
tk be lower semicontinuous over Ak. This, in particular, allows market makers to offer
finite menus of trades, including the null trade (00). In any case, these requirements in-
volve no loss of generality on the equilibrium path, as any equilibrium can be sustained
by tariffs that satisfy them. Off the equilibrium path, they only ensure that the insider
has an optimal quantity profile following any unilateral deviation by a market maker.
We call the above game the arbitrary-tariff game. In this game, market makers can
post arbitrary tariffs, as in Biais et al. (2000) and Attar et al. (2011, 2014). It is also interest-
ing to study the convex-tariff game, in which market makers can only post convex tariffs,
as in Back and Baruch (2013). It is then required of any admissible tariff tk for market
maker k that the domain Ak be a compact interval containing 0 and that tk be convex
over Ak. The set of convex tariffs is the closure of the set of tariffs resulting from finite
collections of limit orders; that is, any convex tariff can be interpreted as a (possibly
infinite) collection of (possibly infinitesimal) limit orders.
2For any convex function g defined over a convex subset of R, we use the notation ∂g(x), ∂−g(x), and
∂+g(x) to denote the subdifferential of g at x, the minimum element of ∂g(x), and the maximum element
of ∂g(x), respectively. Hence ∂g(x) = [∂−g(x)∂+g(x)] (Rockafellar 1970, Section 23).
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2.4 Equilibria with convex tariffs
We focus until Section 9 on pure-strategy perfect-Bayesian equilibria (t1     tK s) with
convex tariffs tk. This last restriction is hardwired in the market makers’ strategy spaces
in the convex-tariff game, whereas it is a requirement on equilibrium strategies in the
arbitrary-tariff game. The focus on convex tariffs intends to describe an idealized dis-
criminatory limit-order book in which market makers place limit orders or collections of
limit orders. Such instruments are known to have nice efficiency properties under com-
plete information.3 It is thus natural to ask how well they perform under adverse selec-
tion. Characterizing equilibria with convex tariffs of the arbitrary-tariff game amounts to
studying the robustness of the book to side trades that may take place outside the book
(Theorem 1); by contrast, characterizing equilibria of the convex-tariff game amounts
to studying the inherent stability of the book (Theorem 2). We perform the latter exer-
cise under stronger assumptions than the former, so that the two sets of results are not
nested.
Focusing on equilibria with convex tariffs also ensures that, on the equilibrium path,
the insider’s preferences over profiles of individual trades are well behaved, as we now
show. Let us first recall that the convexity of the tariffs is preserved under aggregation.
In particular, the minimum aggregate transfer the insider must make in return for an
aggregate quantity Q, namely,
T(Q) ≡ min
{∑
k
tk
(
qk
) : qk ∈Ak for all k and ∑
k
qk =Q
}
 (2)
is convex in Q in equilibrium.4 As a consequence and because the utility functions Ui
are strictly quasiconcave, each type i has a uniquely determined aggregate equilibrium
demand Qi, which is nondecreasing in i under Assumption SC-U . Similarly, if the insider
wants to purchase an aggregate quantity Q−k ∈ ∑l 
=kAl from the market makers other
than k, the minimum transfer she must make in return,
T−k
(
Q−k
) ≡ min
{∑
l 
=k
tl
(
ql
) : ql ∈Al for all l 
= k and ∑
l 
=k
ql = Q−k
}

is convex in Q−k in equilibrium. In turn, each type i evaluates any trade (q t) she may
make with market maker k through the indirect utility function
z−ki (q t) ≡ max
{
Ui
(
q+Q−k t + T−k(Q−k)) : Q−k ∈ ∑
l 
=k
Al
}
 (3)
Observe that the maximum in (3) is attained and that z−ki (q t) is strictly decreasing in t
and continuous in (q t).5 The following lemma is key to our results.
3Biais et al. (1998) show in the single-type case that equilibria of the convex-tariff game exist and are
efficient; see also Dubey (1982). A difference with our setting, though, is that these authors assume that the
insider’s demand for shares is perfectly inelastic.
4Formally, T is the infimal convolution of the individual tariffs tk posted by the market makers (Rock-
afellar 1970, Theorem 5.4). Notice that
∑
k A
k = [0∑k maxAk] when the tariffs tk are convex.
5This follows from Berge’s maximum theorem (Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 17.31).
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Lemma 1. For any profile (t1     tK) of convex tariffs, and for all k and i, z−ki (q t) is
weakly quasiconcave in (q t). Moreover, for each k, the family of functions z−ki satisfies
the following weak single-crossing property.
Property SC-z. For all k, i < j, q ≤ q′, t, and t ′,
z−ki (q t) ≤ z−ki
(
q′ t ′
)
implies z−kj (q t) ≤ z−kj
(
q′ t ′
)
(4)
z−ki (q t) < z
−k
i
(
q′ t ′
)
implies z−kj (q t) < z
−k
j
(
q′ t ′
)
 (5)
Our focus on equilibria with convex tariffs thus ensures that the indirect utility func-
tions z−ki satisfy regularity properties that they inherit from the primitive utility func-
tions Ui.6 It should be noted that, unlike the functions Ui, the functions z
−k
i satisfy
quasiconcavity and single crossing only in a weak sense. For instance, if all market mak-
ers offer to sell any quantity up to some limit at the same price p, then several types
may be indifferent between two trades with any given market maker. Our analysis pays
particular attention to the way in which such ties are broken in equilibrium.
2.5 On the assumptions of the model
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, it is worthwhile to discuss some of the key
assumptions of the model.
Common values As in Glosten (1989) and Biais et al. (2000), the insider in our model
may trade for speculative reasons, so as to use her information on the value of the as-
set, and for hedging reasons, as when she has an endowment in this asset and faces
residual risk about its value. Her willingness to trade thus incorporates both common-
and private-value components. In this interpretation, informational signals and hedg-
ing needs are the insider’s private information. The market makers’ cost of serving the
insider is the expectation of the value of the asset, conditional on the insider’s willing-
ness to trade; it is natural to assume that this cost is higher, the more the insider is willing
to trade.
Convex pricing Our focus on equilibria with convex pricing is institutionally motivated
by the discriminatory limit-order book. Yet other markets present this characteristic. For
instance, in the credit-card market, issuers offer credit cards with various threshold lim-
its and interest rates. Analogous to limit orders, we can think of the former as maximum
quantities and of the latter as limit prices. Consumers effectively face convex tariffs,
as they first and foremost subscribe to the credit cards with the lowest interest rates.
Finally, consumers have different probabilities of repayment and anticipated liquidity
needs. Their willingness to trade thus incorporates both common- and private-value
components.
6This contrasts with the analysis in Attar et al. (2011), where the presence of a capacity constraint and
the absence of restrictions on equilibrium menus could result in indirect utility functions that need not be
continuous or satisfy single crossing.
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Nonanonymity Our analysis focuses on the case where there is a single insider who is
thus perfectly identifiable by the market makers. When there are several insiders whose
identity is not observed by the market makers, each of them can make as many pur-
chases as she wants along any given tariff. As a result, market makers lose the ability to
restrict the quantities they sell at the lowest limit price, at odds with the discriminatory
limit-order book, and convex tariffs effectively become linear. In that case, as in Pauly
(1974), a linear-price equilibrium can always be sustained, in which market makers post
a price p satisfying
p = E
[
ciDi(p)
]
E
[
Di(p)
] 
and thus equal to the expected cost of serving the types who choose to trade at price p,
with weights given by their respective demands Di(p).
Bilateral contracting Our results extend to the multiple-insider case under the follow-
ing assumptions. First, each market maker is able to observe each insider’s identity. Sec-
ond, contracting remains bilateral: market makers cannot observe the tariffs posted by
their competitors or the trades they make with each insider. Third, the aggregate profit
of a market maker is equal to the sum of the profits he earns with all insiders, which
requires linear costs. Then, as shown by Han (2006), each interaction between an in-
sider and the market makers can be studied in isolation. In practice, the book evolves
over time as orders are executed; this requires a dynamic modeling, which is outside the
scope of this paper.
3. The main results
Our central theorems provide necessary conditions for equilibria with convex tariffs.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the arbitrary-tariff game has a pure-strategy equilibrium with
convex tariffs. Then, in any such equilibrium, the following statements hold:
(i) If market makers have linear costs (Assumption L-v), then all trades take place at
a constant price equal to the highest cost cI . Each type i purchases Di(cI) in the
aggregate and all the types who trade have the same cost ci = cI .
(ii) If market makers have strictly convex costs (Assumption C-v), then all trades take
place at a constant price p. Only type I may trade. If DI(p) > 0, then p ∈
∂cI(DI(p)/K) and all market makers sell the same quantity DI(p)/K to type I.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the insider has quasilinear utility (Assumption QL-U), that
market makers have linear costs (Assumption L-v), and that the convex-tariff game has
a pure-strategy equilibrium. Then, in any such equilibrium, all trades take place at a
constant price equal to the highest cost cI . Each type i purchases Di(cI) in the aggregate
and all the types who trade have the same cost ci = cI .
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We prove these two theorems in Sections 4–6. To do so, we presuppose the existence
of an equilibrium (t1     tK s) with convex tariffs of either game and we investigate its
properties. In the arbitrary-tariff game, this equilibrium should be robust to deviations
by market makers to arbitrary tariffs, whereas in the convex-tariff game, it should only
be robust to deviations by market makers to convex tariffs. We provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria in Section 7.
4. Linear pricing
In this section, as well as in the next one, we focus on equilibria with nondecreasing in-
dividual quantities, in which the quantity qki purchased by the insider from each market
maker k is nondecreasing in her type i. This prima facie restriction is motivated by the
fact that, under Assumption SC-U , aggregate quantities purchased in equilibrium are
nondecreasing in the insider’s type. We show that any equilibrium with convex tariffs
that satisfies this property features linear pricing. Section 6 extends this linear-pricing
result to all equilibria with convex tariffs, showing that the restriction to nondecreasing
individual quantities involves no loss of generality.
4.1 The arbitrary-tariff game
We first consider the arbitrary-tariff game, in line with Biais et al. (2000). We start with
a tie-breaking lemma that provides a lower bound for each market maker’s equilibrium
expected profit given the tariffs posted by his competitors. We then use this lemma to
prove our linear-pricing result.
4.1.1 How the market makers can break ties Consider an equilibrium (t1     tK s)
with convex tariffs of the arbitrary-tariff game and suppose that market maker k deviates
to a menu {(qi ti) : i = 1     I} ∪ {(00)} designed so that type i selects the trade (qi ti).
For this to be the case, the following incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality
constraints must be satisfied:
z−ki (qi ti) ≥ z−ki (qj tj) and z−ki (qi ti) ≥ z−ki (00) i j = 1     I (6)
Notice that these constraints are formulated in terms of the insider’s indirect utility func-
tions, which are endogenous objects. Property SC-z suggest that we consider a subset of
these constraints, namely, the downward local constraints
z−ki (qi ti) ≥ z−ki (qi−1 ti−1) i = 1     I (7)
with (q0 t0) ≡ (00) by convention to handle the individual-rationality constraint of
type 1. Clearly, these constraints are not sufficient to ensure that each type i will choose
to trade (qi ti) following market maker k’s deviation. First, local upward incentive con-
straints need not be satisfied. Second, and more importantly, some type may be indif-
ferent between two trades, thus creating some ties. Nevertheless, as we shall now see,
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as long as he sticks to menus with nondecreasing quantities, market maker k can secure
the expected profit he would obtain if he could break such ties in his favor. Define
V k
(
t−k
) ≡ sup
{∑
i
miv
k
i (qi ti)
}
 (8)
where the supremum in (8) is taken over all menus {(qi ti) : i = 0     I} that satisfy (7)
and that have nondecreasing quantities, that is, qi ≥ qi−1 for all i.
Lemma 2. In any pure-strategy equilibrium (t1     tK s) with convex tariffs of the
arbitrary-tariff game, each market maker k’s expected profit is at least V k(t−k).
The intuition is that, from any menu satisfying the constraints in (8), we can play
both with transfers (which we can increase if (7) does not bind for some type) and with
quantities (so as to eliminate cycles of binding incentive-compatibility constraints) to
build another menu with no lower expected profit such that (6) holds. We can then
slightly perturb transfers to make these constraints strict inequalities, which ensures
that the insider has a unique best response. This result relies only on Assumptions SC-
U and SC-v. In particular, market makers need not have identical, quasilinear, or even
quasiconcave profit functions.
4.1.2 Equilibria with nondecreasing individual quantities The above tie-breaking
lemma suggests that we first focus on equilibria with nondecreasing individual quan-
tities, that is, qki ≥ qki−1 for all i and k. Suppose, therefore, that such an equilibrium
exists. The equilibrium trades of market maker k then satisfy all the constraints in prob-
lem (8). An immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is thus that these trades must form a
solution to (8). Because the functions z−ki are strictly decreasing in transfers and weakly
quasiconcave, it follows that the downward local constraints (7) must bind. This stan-
dard result turns out to be very demanding when equilibrium tariffs are convex. Indeed,
consider a type who exhausts aggregate supply at some marginal price p. When fac-
ing a given market maker, this type never wants to mimic another type who does not
do likewise because she would end up paying too much for her aggregate demand. In
these circumstances, we may wonder how to build a chain of binding downward local
constraints that goes all the way down to the null trade.
Let us make these points more formally. When market maker k posts a convex tariff
tk, his supply correspondence sk is the inverse of the subdifferential of tk (Biais et al.
2000, Definition 2). That is, for any quantity q and marginal price p,
q ∈ sk(p) if and only if p ∈ ∂tk(q) (9)
The set sk(p) is a nonempty interval with lower and upper bounds sk(p) and sk(p) that
are nondecreasing in p. When sk(p) < sk(p), tk is affine with slope p over sk(p). We let
S(p) ≡ ∑k sk(p) and S(p) ≡ ∑k sk(p). Observe that sk is right-continuous for all k and
that S inherits this property.
Now suppose, to the contrary, that for some i and p, we have, in equilibrium,
Qi ≥ S(p) > 0
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For this value of p, consider the lowest such i; with a slight abuse of notation, denote it
again by i. Because type i has strictly convex preferences and her aggregate equilibrium
demand Qi is uniquely determined, and because, to satisfy this demand, she exhausts
aggregate supply S(p) at marginal price p, any of her best responses must be such that
she purchases at least sk(p) from each market maker k: otherwise, she would end up
paying more than T(Qi) for Qi. As the downward local constraints (7) of type i must
bind for all k, two cases may arise.
Case 1: i > 1. Because i is the lowest type such that Qi ≥ S(p), we must have Qi−1 <
S(p) and thus qki−1 < s
k(p) for some k. Hence the incentive-compatibility
constraint (7) of type i cannot bind for market maker k, a contradiction.
Case 2: i = 1. Because S(p) > 0, at least one market maker k must offer sk(p) > 0
at marginal price p. Hence the individual-rationality constraint (7) of type 1
cannot bind for market maker k, once again a contradiction.
This shows that, for any marginal price p at which aggregate supply is strictly positive, all
types must purchase an aggregate quantity below this level: Qi < S(p) for all i if S(p) > 0.
As S is right-continuous, we can safely consider the infimum of the set of such prices;
with a slight abuse of notation, denote it again by p. At marginal price p, either aggregate
supply is zero and there is no trade or aggregate supply is strictly positive and, because
p is the infimum of the set of marginal prices at which supply is strictly positive, the
insider faces an aggregate tariff T that is linear with slope p up to S(p). Because, by the
above reasoning, Qi is strictly less than S(p) for all i, each type i must purchase Di(p) in
the aggregate. Hence the following result holds.
Proposition 1. In any pure-strategy equilibrium with convex tariffs and nondecreasing
individual quantities of the arbitrary-tariff game, there exists a price p such that all trades
take place at price p and each type i purchases Di(p) in the aggregate. Moreover, the
aggregate tariff T is linear with slope p up to S(p), and Di(p) < S(p) for all i if S(p) > 0.
The upshot of Proposition 1 is that the possibility of side trades leads to linear pric-
ing. This shows the disciplining role of competition in our model: although market mak-
ers can post arbitrary tariffs, they end up trading at the same price. The role of binding
downward local constraints is graphically clear, as illustrated in Figure 1: when such a
constraint binds for type i and market maker k, the latter’s equilibrium tariff must be
linear over [qki−1 qki ] because the indirect utility function z−ki represents convex prefer-
ences. In turn, binding local constraints can be reconciled with linear pricing only if
these preferences are locally linear. Intuitively, everything happens as if, from the per-
spective of any market maker, each type who is willing to trade had a valuation for the
asset equal to the common price quoted by the other market makers. This, of course,
requires competition. Indeed, when there is a monopolistic market maker, it is also op-
timal for him to make the insider’s downward local constraints bind; but, now, these
constraints are expressed in terms of the primitive utility functions Ui. As the latter rep-
resent strictly convex preferences, the resulting allocation cannot be implemented by a
convex tariff.
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Figure 1. Binding downward local constraints and linearity.
This linear-pricing result is very general: as pointed out in our discussion of
Lemma 2, we need not postulate that the market makers have identical, quasilinear,
or even quasiconcave profit functions. This result also strikingly differs from those ob-
tained in the continuous-type case by Biais et al. (2000), who show that an equilibrium
with strictly convex tariffs and nondecreasing individual quantities exists under certain
conditions on players’ payoff and distribution functions.
4.2 The convex-tariff game
So far, our analysis relies on the market makers’ ability to post arbitrary tariffs, including
finite menus of trades. A natural question is whether this gives them too much freedom
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to deviate, thus artificially driving the linear-pricing result. To investigate this issue, we
now consider the convex-tariff game, in line with Back and Baruch (2013). We conduct
the analysis under two additional assumptions. First, we assume that each type has
quasilinear utility (Assumption QL-U). Second, we assume that market makers have
linear costs (Assumption L-v). These assumptions involve some loss of generality, as
they exclude wealth effects or insurance considerations. Yet they are general enough
to encompass prominent examples studied in the literature, such as the CARA Gaus-
sian example studied by Back and Baruch (2013, Example 1). These assumptions are
maintained throughout our analysis of the convex-tariff game.
Focusing on convex tariffs has two main advantages. First, it allows us to rely on sim-
ple tools such as supply functions and first-order conditions, the properties of which are
well known under convexity assumptions. This contrasts with using arbitrary menus
and their cohorts of incentive-compatibility constraints, and makes for more intuitive
proofs—some of our arguments are in fact quite direct when considering figures. Sec-
ond, compared to the arbitrary-tariff game, we reduce the set of deviations available to
market makers. This can a priori only enlarge the set of equilibria. In spite of this, for
the convex-tariff game, we shall derive a linear-pricing result similar to Proposition 1.
The structure of the argument parallels that of Section 4.1: we start with a tie-breaking
lemma, which we then use to prove our linear-pricing result.
4.2.1 How the market makers can break ties We first reformulate Lemma 2. Consider
an equilibrium (t1     tK s). Suppose that market maker k deviates to a convex tariff t
with domain A. For type i to select the quantity qi in this tariff, it must be that
qi ∈ arg max
{
z−ki
(
q t(q)
) : q ∈ A} (10)
This constraint is not sufficient to ensure that type i will choose to purchase qi from
market maker k following his deviation. Indeed, type i may be indifferent between two
quantities made available by the tariff t, thus creating some ties. Nevertheless, as we
shall now see, as long as he sticks to nondecreasing quantities, market maker k can se-
cure the expected profit he would obtain if he could break such ties in his favor. Define
V kco
(
t−k
) ≡ sup
{∑
i
miv
k
i
(
qi t(qi)
)}
 (11)
where the supremum in (11) is taken over all convex tariffs t and all families of quantities
qi that satisfy (10) for all i and that are nondecreasing, that is, qi ≥ qi−1 for all i.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the insider has quasilinear utility and market makers have lin-
ear costs. Then, in any pure-strategy equilibrium (t1     tK s) of the convex-tariff game,
each market maker k’s expected profit is at least V kco(t
−k).
When the insider has quasilinear utility, only the marginal-price schedule associated
to the tariff t matters to him. As illustrated in Figure 2, we can, therefore, replace the tariff
t by a piecewise-linear tariff, labelled tpq, which induces the same best response for the
insider and yields market maker k an expected profit no less than that he obtains by
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tpq(q1)
tpq(q2)
q1 q2
•
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tpq t
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p2p2
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Figure 2. Replacing the tariff t by a piecewise-linear tariff tpq that induces the same choices qi
for each insider type i and yields market maker k a strictly higher expected profit.
posting t. Furthermore, consider a segment of this piecewise-linear tariff with marginal
price p and the set of types who trade on this segment. Under adverse selection, there
exists a quantity q available along this segment such that market maker k prefers that all
types make their purchases closer to this quantity. If (q tpq(q)) is interior to the segment
with slope p, then this change can be achieved as follows. First, market maker k can
increase his expected profit by truncating this segment at q: this reduces the quantities
purchased by those types, with transfers that are as least as high. In addition, market
maker k can slightly lower the marginal price p. This ensures that all the relevant types
purchase a quantity closer to q. As illustrated in Figure 3, proceeding in this way for each
segment of the tariff tpq, we obtain a second piecewise-linear tariff, labelled t̂, which
allows market maker k to secure the announced expected profit.
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Figure 3. The truncation t̂ of the piecewise-linear tariff tpq.
4.2.2 Equilibria with nondecreasing individual quantities Lemma 3 implies that,
in any equilibrium with nondecreasing individual quantities, market makers post
piecewise-linear tariffs that we can interpret as finite collections of limit orders. An-
other feature of such an equilibrium that follows from Lemma 3 is that if there is a kink
in the aggregate tariff, at least one type exactly trades at this kink; otherwise, at least one
market maker could increase his expected profit by slightly raising his marginal price
around the corresponding kink in his tariff. Any type trading at a kink exactly exhausts
aggregate supply S(p) at some marginal price p for which S(p) > 0 and, therefore, has
a unique best response that consists of purchasing sk(p) from each market maker k. As
a result, each market maker offering trades at marginal price p is indispensable for any
such type to reach her equilibrium utility.
However, simple price-undercutting arguments show that the tariff resulting from
the aggregation of all market makers’ tariffs shares with the Glosten (1994) competitive
tariff described in the Introduction the property that any increase in quantity must be
priced at the corresponding expected increase in costs. By construction, this implies
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zero expected profit. But then, if some type were to exhaust aggregate supply S(p) at
some marginal price p for which S(p) > 0, at least one of the market makers offering
trades at this marginal price could raise his tariff in a profitable way. Hence the following
result holds.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the insider has quasilinear utility and market makers have
linear costs. Then, in any pure-strategy equilibrium with nondecreasing individual quan-
tities of the convex-tariff game, there exists a price p such that all trades take place at price
p and each type i purchases Di(p) in the aggregate. Moreover, the aggregate tariff T is
linear with slope p up to S(p), and Di(p) < S(p) for all i if S(p) > 0.
In particular, in the pure common-value case where the cost ci is strictly increasing
in the insider’s type i, the Glosten (1994) allocation cannot be implemented in an equi-
librium with nondecreasing individual quantities, except in the degenerate case where
only type I happens to trade in that allocation.
5. Market breakdown
Our next task consists of determining prices and quantities in the linear-pricing equilib-
ria with nondecreasing individual quantities characterized in Propositions 1 and 2. We
show that in both the arbitrary-tariff and the convex-tariff games, such equilibria typ-
ically exhibit an extreme form of market breakdown and only exist under exceptional
circumstances: in the terminology of Hendren (2014), we either have an instance of
equilibrium of market unravelling or, more likely, an instance of unravelling of market
equilibrium.
5.1 Linear costs
We start with the case where market makers have linear costs (Assumption L-v), as in
Theorems 1(i) and 2. The argument is twofold.
First, a simple price-undercutting argument implies that market makers must make
zero expected profit: otherwise, because the functions Di are continuous, any market
maker k could claim almost all profits for himself by lowering his price slightly below
the equilibrium price p. It follows that if trade takes place in equilibrium, p cannot be
above the highest possible cost cI .
Second, in equilibrium, p cannot be below cI either. Otherwise, each market maker
would want to reduce the quantity he sells to type I, which he can do by placing a limit
order at the equilibrium price, with a well chosen maximum quantity. Formally, in the
arbitrary-tariff game, any market maker k could deviate to a menu that would allow
types i < I to purchase the equilibrium quantity qki at price p, whereas type I would be
asked to purchase only qkI−1 at price p. Such a menu is incentive-compatible and in-
dividually rational, with nondecreasing quantities. Similarly, in the convex-tariff game,
any market maker k could deviate to a limit order t(q)= pmin{qqkI−1}. A best response
for any type i < I then consists of purchasing qki as before, whereas a best response for
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type I consists of purchasing qkI−1, overall preserving nondecreasing quantities. In either
case, it follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 that the variation in market maker k’s expected
profit is at most zero; that is,
mI(p− cI)
(
qkI−1 − qkI
) ≤ 0 k= 1    K
Summing these inequalities over k yields
mI(p− cI)
[
DI−1(p)−DI(p)
] ≤ 0
which, under Assumption ID-U , implies that p ≥ cI if DI(p) > 0. Because aggregate
expected profits are zero, we obtain that p = ci = cI for any type i who trades. Hence the
following result holds.
Proposition 3. Suppose that market makers have linear costs and, in the convex-tariff
game, that the insider has quasilinear utility. Then, in either the arbitrary-tariff or the
convex-tariff game, if trade takes place in a linear-pricing equilibrium with nondecreas-
ing individual quantities, then the equilibrium price is equal to the highest cost cI and
the cost of serving all the types who trade is equal to cI .
This result highlights a tension between zero expected profits in the aggregate and
the high equilibrium price cI . In the pure private-value case where the cost ci is indepen-
dent of the insider’s type i, this tension disappears and we obtain the usual Bertrand re-
sult, leading to an efficient outcome. By contrast, in the pure common-value case where
the cost ci is strictly increasing in the insider’s type i, only the highest type I can trade
in equilibrium, whereas all types i < I must be excluded from trade. This market break-
down due to adverse selection is much more severe than in the exclusive-competition
models of Akerlof (1970) or Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), as at most one type trades in
equilibrium regardless of the distribution of types. Moreover, the conditions for the ex-
istence of an equilibrium become very restrictive: we must have Di(cI)= 0 for all i < I if
an equilibrium is to exist at all. Notice, in particular, that whenever Di(cI) > 0 for some
i < I, there is a sharp discontinuity when we move from the pure private-value case,
where ci = cI for all i, to the pure common-value case, where ci < cI for all i < I: in the
former case, each type efficiently trades at price cI in equilibrium, whereas an equilib-
rium fails to exist in the latter case even if the cost differences cI − ci are arbitrarily small
for all i < I.
5.2 General profit functions
We now consider more general profit functions for the market makers. This encom-
passes the case where they are risk-neutral with respect to transfers but have strictly
convex order-handling costs, as in Roll (1984), or more general cases allowing for risk
aversion, as in Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983). We conduct the analysis in the
context of the arbitrary-tariff game, as in Theorem 1(ii). Again, the argument is twofold.
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5.2.1 A property of limit orders First, we provide a property of limit orders that does
not depend on strategic considerations and may, therefore, be of independent interest.
Consider a situation in which all trades must take place at price p and the demands
Di(p) are bounded; such is the case, according to Proposition 1, in any equilibrium with
convex tariffs and nondecreasing individual quantities of the arbitrary-tariff game. Mar-
ket maker k’s most preferred trades at price p, assuming that he sticks to nondecreasing
quantities, solve
sup
{∑
i
miv
k
i (qipqi)
}
 (12)
subject to the feasibility constraints
0 ≤ qi ≤Di(p) i = 1     I (13)
and the constraint that quantities be nondecreasing, that is, qi ≥ qi−1 for all i. For any
maximum quantity q, let us define limit-order quantities at price p as
min
{
Di(p)q
}
 i = 1     I (14)
The following result builds on the quasiconcavity of the functions vki and on Assump-
tion SC-v to characterize the solutions to problem (12)–(13).
Lemma 4. Let p be such that the demands Di(p) are bounded. Then problem (12)–(13)
has a solution with limit-order quantities at price p. Besides, if vki (qpq) is strictly quasi-
concave in q for all i, then all the solutions to problem (12)–(13) are limit-order quantities
at price p.
The proof relies on a very simple reasoning: if the price is high enough to convince a
market maker to sell a strictly positive quantity q to the highest type I, then, according to
Assumption SC-v, market maker k will want to sell the highest possible quantities—that
is, as the case may be, Di(p) or q—to types i < I.7 This result itself is a neat character-
ization of limit orders: they are the optimal tool under adverse selection for a market
maker who must sell nondecreasing quantities at a given fixed price.
5.2.2 Equilibria Our second argument relies on equilibrium considerations. Notice
first that in a linear-pricing equilibrium with nondecreasing individual quantities in
which all trades take place at price p, each market maker k’s expected profit cannot
be above the expected profit from his most preferred trades at price p. Now, for each
q, market maker k could deviate to the menu {(min{Di(p)q}pmin{Di(p)q}) : i =
1     I} ∪ {(00)}, offering to sell limit-order quantities at price p. Such an offer is
incentive-compatible and individually rational, with nondecreasing quantities. It then
7The proof given in the Supplemental Material allows for a continuum of types. As for the generality of
the result, notice that the ordering of the demands Di(p) does not play any particular role. We can relax
this assumption, provided that the constraint that quantities be nondecreasing is replaced by the constraint
that quantities be co-monotonic with aggregate demand, that is, Di(p) ≤Dj(p) implies qi ≤ qj .
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follows from Lemma 2 that, in equilibrium, market maker k can secure the correspond-
ing expected profit, regardless of the value of q.8 In turn, Lemma 4 implies that, in equi-
librium, each market maker k’s expected profit is equal to the value of problem (12)–(13).
In particular, the quantities sold by market maker k in equilibrium must be solutions to
problem (12)–(13). Finally, if vki (qpq) is strictly quasiconcave in q for all i and k, such
solutions must be limit-order quantities.
Now suppose that market makers have identical profit functions vki ≡ vi and that,
moreover, vi(qpq) is strictly concave in q for all i. Then all problems (12)–(13) are
identical and, by strict concavity, they admit a single common solution, which must
be a family of limit-order quantities. Each market maker k thus sells in equilibrium the
quantities min{Di(p)q} for some well chosen q. But as no type i can purchase more
than Di(p) in total, it must be that each market maker k sells the same quantity q to
all the insider’s types who trade and, therefore, that the aggregate demands of all those
types is the same. However, by Assumption ID-U , DI(p) > DI−1(p) if trade takes place
in equilibrium. Hence the following result holds.
Proposition 4. Suppose that market makers have identical profit functions vi and con-
sider a price p such that vi(qpq) is strictly concave in q for all i. Then if trade takes
place at price p in a linear-pricing equilibrium with nondecreasing individual quan-
tities of the arbitrary-tariff game, then only type I can trade and, if DI(p) > 0, then
{DI(p)/K} = arg max{vI(ppq) : q} and each market maker sells DI(p)/K to type I only.
The endogenous condition on profit functions in Proposition 4 is satisfied if As-
sumption C-v holds, as in Theorem 1(ii), so that market makers are risk-neutral with
respect to transfers but have identical strictly convex costs Roll (1984). It is also satisfied
if market makers are risk-averse, as when vi(q t) ≡ v(t − ciq) for some strictly concave
von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function v (Stoll 1978, Ho and Stoll 1981, 1983).
In the single-type case, Proposition 4 states that any equilibrium is competitive in
the usual sense: first, the insider purchases her optimal demand D1(p) at price p; next,
the market makers maximize their profit v1(qpq) at price p; finally, the equilibrium
price p equalizes the insider’s demand and the sum of the market makers’ supplies.
Equilibrium outcomes are then first-best efficient.
With multiple types, the unique candidate equilibrium outcome remains that which
would prevail in an economy populated by type I only. A necessary condition for equi-
librium is thus that all types i < I purchase a zero quantity at the equilibrium price p.
This market-breakdown outcome is similar to the one characterized in Proposition 3
when market makers have linear costs, and the conditions for the existence of an equi-
librium are very restrictive in this case as well.
A novel insight of Proposition 4 is that the market breaks down whether or not the
environment features common values. To illustrate this point, consider, for instance,
8Intuitively, for each q, market maker k can place a limit order at price p′ <p with maximum quantity q.
As he offers the lowest price, he sells a quantity min{Di(p′)q} to each type i. Because demand and profit
functions are continuous, by making p′ go to p, market maker k can claim the expected profit associated
to the quantities (14).
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the case of strictly convex costs (Assumption C-v) and suppose that the cost function is
the same for each type—that is, ci(q) ≡ c(q) for all i and q—whereas demands Di(p) are
strictly increasing in i. As any market maker’s profit t − c(q) on a given trade (q t) does
not depend on the insider’s type, we are in a private-value setting, so that the only risk
market makers are exposed to is to face a high-demand type. Still, oligopolistic competi-
tion threatens the existence of equilibria: each market maker wants to reduce his maxi-
mum supply if the equilibrium price is too low, but a high equilibrium price strengthens
the competition to attract lower types. Overall, competition is strong enough to imply
that, in equilibrium, at most one type can trade.
6. Other equilibrium outcomes
To complete the proof of Theorems 1 and 2, there remains to show that focusing on
equilibria with nondecreasing individual quantities involves no loss of generality; that is,
we can turn any equilibrium with convex tariffs into an equilibrium with the same tariffs
and the same expected payoffs for all players, but now with nondecreasing individual
quantities. This result holds both in the arbitrary-tariff game and in the convex-tariff
game. The proof is actually very general and relies only on a property specifying that, in
a certain sense, allocations with nondecreasing individual quantities are efficient.
To understand this point, observe that market makers have to choose their tariffs be-
fore demand realizes. Because, by Assumptions SC-U and SC-v, high-demand types are
more costly to serve, how the market makers share the resulting aggregate risk becomes
a central question, which motivates the following analysis. Given a profile (t1     tK) of
convex tariffs, recall that each type has a uniquely determined aggregate trade (QiTi).
An allocation (q11     q
K
1      q
1
I      q
K
I ) is feasible if
∑
k
qki =Qi and
∑
k
tk
(
qki
) = Ti i = 1     I (15)
That is, a feasible allocation describes a best response of the insider to the tariffs
(t1     tK). A feasible allocation is efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other
feasible allocation from the market makers’ viewpoint; that is, there is no best response
of the insider that yields at least as high an expected profit to each market maker and a
strictly higher expected profit to at least one market maker. Our analysis relies on the
following property.
Property E. For any profile of convex tariffs (t1     tK), there exists an efficient alloca-
tion with nondecreasing individual quantities.
This property is reminiscent of the mutuality principle in risk-sharing (Borch 1962):
efficiency requires that any increase in the aggregate quantity to be shared should trans-
late into an increase in individual quantities. However, in our setting, the market mak-
ers’ profit functions can be state-dependent because they can directly depend on the
insider’s type. Moreover, the convexity of the tariffs (t1     tK) can make the profits
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vki (q t
k(q)) nonconcave in q. To bypass these difficulties, we have to impose more re-
strictions on the market maker’s profit functions than in the previous sections. Notable
special cases are Assumptions L-v and C-v used in Theorems 1 and 2, as the following
result shows.9
Lemma 5. Suppose that all market makers have identical quasilinear profit functions
vki (q t) ≡ t − ci(q)
where the cost ci(q) is convex in q for all i. Then Property E is satisfied.
We can now turn to the study of an arbitrary equilibrium (t1     tK s) with convex
tariffs of either the arbitrary-tariff or the convex-tariff game. Let vk be the equilibrium
expected profit of market maker k. Depending on the game under study, Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3 provide lower bounds V k(t−k) and V kco(t−k) for vk, respectively. We can build
another lower bound by adding to problems (8) and (11) the additional constraint that
the transfers to market maker k be computed according to the equilibrium tariff tk; let
the corresponding value be V k(t1     tK). Therefore,
vk ≥ V k(t1     tK) k= 1    K (16)
In addition, if Property E is satisfied, then given the tariffs (t1     tK), there exists an ef-
ficient allocation (q11     q
K
1      q
1
I      q
K
I ) with nondecreasing individual quantities.
In particular, for each k, the quantities (qk1      q
k
I ) satisfy the constraints in the problem
that defines V k(t1     tK). This implies
V k
(
t1     tK
) ≥ ∑
i
miv
k
i
(
qki  t
k
(
qki
))
 k = 1    K (17)
Chaining inequalities (16) and (17), we obtain that each market maker k’s equilibrium
expected profit is no less than his expected profit from the allocation (q11     q
K
1     
q1I      q
K
I ). Because this allocation is efficient, this is impossible unless all inequalities
(16) and (17) are in fact equalities. As a result,
vk =
∑
i
miv
k
i
(
qki  t
k
(
qki
))
 k= 1    K (18)
We now build an equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation (q11     q
K
1     
q1I      q
K
I ). Let us define s
∗ as the insider’s strategy that selects this allocation if the
market makers post the tariffs (t1     tK); otherwise, let s∗ select the same quantities
as s. We claim that (t1     tK s∗) is an equilibrium. First, the insider plays a best re-
sponse to any tariff profile. Moreover, in the initial equilibrium (t1     tK s), no market
9We can more generally show that Lemma 5 holds for market makers with heterogenous cost functions
cki , the derivatives of which satisfy c
k′
i = gi ◦ ak, where gi is strictly increasing and ak is nondecreasing.
This, in particular, allows us to handle the case of market makers with heterogeneous inventories, where
cki (q)≡ ci(q− Ik) for some given inventories Ik.
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maker has a profitable deviation. Hence, for each k and for any tariff t̂k 
= tk,10 we have
vk ≥
∑
i
miv
k
i
(
ski
(
t̂k t−k
)
 t̂k
(
ski
(
t̂k t−k
)))

From (18) and the definition of s∗, this can be rewritten as
∑
i
miv
k
i
(
s∗ki
(
tk t−k
)
 tk
(
s∗ki
(
tk t−k
))) ≥ ∑
i
miv
k
i
(
s∗ki
(
t̂k t−k
)
 t̂k
(
s∗ki
(
t̂k t−k
)))

which expresses that market maker k has no profitable deviation when the other market
makers post tariffs t−k and the insider plays her best response s∗. Hence the following
result holds.
Proposition 5. Suppose that Property E is satisfied and that in the convex-tariff game,
the insider has quasilinear utility and the market makers have linear costs. Then if
(t1     tK s) is an equilibrium with convex tariffs of either the arbitrary-tariff or the
convex-tariff game, there exists a strategy s∗ for the insider such that (t1     tK s∗) is
an equilibrium with nondecreasing individual quantities that yields the same expected
profit to each market maker as (t1     tK s).
We can now complete the proof of Theorems 1 and 2. By Lemma 5, Property E is
satisfied under Assumptions L-v and C-v. It then follows from Proposition 5 that we
can turn any equilibrium with convex tariffs into an equilibrium with the same tariffs
and nondecreasing individual quantities. Propositions 1 and 2 then imply that all equi-
libria with convex tariffs must involve linear pricing, and Theorems 1 and 2 follow as
immediate consequences of Propositions 3 and 4. A byproduct of Proposition 5 is that
equilibria with convex tariffs, when they exist, support allocations that are efficient from
the market makers’ viewpoint.
7. Necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium
We now provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with
convex tariffs. To do so, we first define a notion of marginal rates of substitution for the
insider that does not require differentiability. Specifically, let τi(QT) be the supremum
of the set of prices p such that
Ui(QT) < max
{
Ui
(
Q+Q′T +pQ′) : Q′ ≥ 0}
That is, τi(QT) is type i’s willingness to increase his purchases at (QT). In line with At-
tar et al. (2017), we impose the intuitive fanning-out condition that for any given transfer
T , an increase in the quantity Q does not increase this willingness to pay.
Assumption FO-U . For all i and T , τi(QT) is nonincreasing in Q.
10In the convex-tariff game, t̂k must additionally be convex.
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It should be noted that Assumption FO-U automatically holds under Assump-
tion QL-U . More generally, Assumption FO-U holds under many alternative specifi-
cations, allowing for risk aversion and wealth effects. An important implication of As-
sumption FO-U is the following property.
Property P. For all i, Q, and T ≥ 0,
Ui(QT) ≥Ui(00) implies τi(QT) ≤ τi(00)
Indeed, from any point (QT) such that T ≥ 0, we can draw an indifference curve
for Ui that necessarily crosses the Q-axis from above at the right of (00). At this point,
the marginal rate of substitution is not higher than at (00) by Assumption FO-U , and it
is not lower than at (QT) by quasiconcavity of Ui. This proves Property P.
We also impose the following Inada condition.
Assumption I-U . For all i, Q, T , and p> 0,
arg max
{
Ui
(
Q+Q′T +pQ′) : Q′ ≥ 0}< ∞
Under Assumption I-U , the demand Di(p) of type i at any strictly positive price p is
finite; in particular, the demands in Theorems 1 and 2 are well defined, which is clearly
a necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium.
Let us now turn to the market makers’ costs. We give a unified treatment of the
linear-cost case (Assumption L-v) and of the convex-cost case (Assumption C-v), gener-
ically denoting the cost of serving type i by the function ci(q), with ci(q) ≡ ciq in the
linear-cost case. Define i∗ as being equal to I in the convex-cost case and being equal
to the lowest i such that ci = cI in the linear-cost case. According to Theorems 1 and 2,
in equilibrium, types i < i∗ do not trade and types i ≥ i∗ purchase their demands Di(p)
at some price p ∈ ∂cI(DI(p)/K) equal to cI in the linear-cost case. Thus the relevant
measure of costs is, for types i < i∗, their marginal costs ∂+ci(0) at 0 and, for types i ≥ i∗,
the price p. The upper-tail expectation of these costs, conditional on the insider’s type
being at least i, is thus
ci(p) ≡
∑
i∗>j≥i
mj∂
+cj(0)+p
∑
j≥i∗i
mj
∑
j≥i
mj
 (19)
with
∑
∅
= 0 by convention. The central theorem of this section provides necessary and
sufficient conditions for equilibria with convex tariffs.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the fanning-out and Inada conditions are satisfied (Assump-
tions FO-U and I-U). Additionally, make the following suppositions:
(i) In the arbitrary-tariff game, market makers have linear costs (Assumption L-v) or
convex costs (Assumption C-v).
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(ii) In the convex-tariff game, the insider has quasilinear utility (Assumption QL-U)
and market makers have linear costs (Assumption L-v).
Then the arbitrary-tariff and the convex-tariff games have a pure-strategy equilibrium
with convex tariffs if and only if, for some p such that p ∈ ∂cI(DI(p)/K),
i < i∗ implies τi(00) ≤ ci(p) (20)
An equilibrium can then be supported by each market maker posting the linear tariff
t(q)≡ pq q ∈
[
0
1
K − 1DI(p)
]
(21)
and each type i splitting her demand Di(p) equally among the K market makers.
The intuition for this result is twofold. As for types i ≥ i∗, the quantities they pur-
chase must be efficiently allocated among the market makers, as shown in Section 6.
Under linear pricing, this implies that each market maker sells an element of his com-
petitive supply at price p. Hence no market maker can increase his expected profit from
trading with types i ≥ i∗, because he already sells his most preferred quantities at price
p to them. As for types i < i∗, the key idea is that if a trade attracts any such type i, then it
also attracts all types j > i by Property SC-z. Therefore, the relevant notion of marginal
cost is the upper-tail expectation of costs ci(p). Condition (20) then ensures that this
trade takes place at a price strictly below ci(p) and thus, in expectation, makes a loss.
Overall, these results confirm that equilibria exist only under exceptional circum-
stances, in which only the types with the highest marginal cost are willing to trade; in
that case, the equilibrium coincides with a competitive equilibrium of a fictitious econ-
omy populated by those types only. Consider for instance the linear-cost case. In the
pure private-value case, where ci = cI for all i, conditions (20) are emptily satisfied as
i∗ = 1. Hence an equilibrium always exists, in which each type efficiently trades at
marginal cost cI ; the equilibrium allocation is first-best efficient. By contrast, in the
pure common-value case, where ci < cI for all i < I, conditions (20) are very demand-
ing: in an equilibrium in which type I trades, we must have τi(00) ≤ E[cj | j ≥ i] for all
i < I and τI(00) > cI . That is, type I must have preferences that are sufficiently differ-
ent from those of types i < I. In particular, when we let the number of types grow large
so as to approximate an interval, it is increasingly difficult and, eventually, impossible to
satisfy these conditions.
In the constructed equilibrium, each market maker offers a continuum of trades by
placing a limit order allowing the insider to purchase any quantity up to DI(p)/(K − 1)
at price p. This first ensures that no market maker is indispensable for providing type I
with her demand DI(p) at price p, which, as we have seen, is a necessary condition for
equilibrium. This also ensures that the insider’s indirect utility functions satisfy Prop-
erty SC-z. As a result, if a market maker deviates, the insider has a best response in
which she purchases nondecreasing quantities from him. In this way, cream-skimming
deviations are blocked: any attempt to propose a profitable trade to any type with a
marginal cost less than the market price fails because, given the limit orders placed by
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the other market makers, this trade also attracts all the higher types. Thus the contin-
uum of trades offered by each market maker at price p serve as latent contracts that
prevent his competitors from deviating.
8. Discussion
In this section, we put our findings in perspective and relate them to the literature.
a. The model we use is standard—we may even say canonical. The restriction to equi-
libria with convex tariffs is motivated by our focus on discriminatory pricing in a limit-
order book. We allow for arbitrary discrete distributions for the insider’s type and for
a rich set of convex preferences for the insider and the market makers. The strict con-
vexity of the insider’s preferences ensures that her aggregate demand for the asset con-
tinuously responds to price variations. This captures the idea that she has both infor-
mational and hedging motives for trade, as in Glosten (1989), Biais et al. (2000), and
Back and Baruch (2013). News traders, that is, insiders who are perfectly informed of
the liquidation value of the asset and trade only on the basis of this information, as in
Dennert (1993) or Baruch and Glosten (2017), are a limiting case of our analysis. Finally,
the model is fully strategic in that, unlike much of the market-microstructure literature,
it does not rely on noise traders who are insensitive to prices.
b. A key insight of our analysis is that no market maker is indispensable for provid-
ing the insider with her aggregate equilibrium trades; otherwise, he would have an in-
centive to raise his price on the additional trade he makes with some type. We use
standard mechanism-design techniques (Lemma 2) or standard price-theory arguments
(Lemma 3) to show that he can do so without reducing his expected profit on the other
types. The discreteness of the set of types is crucial for the precise targeting required
by this logic. As we have seen, it follows that the insider’s downward local constraints
must be binding when suitably expressed in terms of her indirect utility functions. This,
in turn, implies that equilibrium tariffs must be linear. By contrast, in models with a
continuum of types, Biais et al. (2000) and Back and Baruch (2013) show how to con-
struct a symmetric equilibrium in which each market maker posts a strictly convex tar-
iff. Each market maker is then indispensable as each type has a unique best response;
in particular, tie breaking is no longer a relevant issue. Although strictly convex tariffs
are not consistent with equilibrium in the discrete-type case—as the consideration of
the single-type case readily shows—they can be sustained in the continuous-type case
because a local change in the tariff affects the behavior of all neighboring types. To illus-
trate this point, suppose that a market maker deviates by proposing, instead of a portion
of his strictly convex equilibrium tariff, the corresponding chord. This would increase
his expected profit if the insider’s behavior remained the same. But such a change raises
(lowers) the marginal price for relatively low-cost (high-cost) types who would choose
trades in this portion of the tariff. As a result, under common values, trades change in
an unfavorable way for the deviating market maker. This last effect is reinforced when
the insider simultaneously trades with several market makers, as any increase in the
quantity she purchases from a market maker is compensated by a reduction in the quan-
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tity she purchases from the others. The equilibrium in Biais et al. (2000) and Back and
Baruch (2013) strikes a delicate balance between these two effects. This is why their con-
struction requires complex restrictions on the distribution of the insider’s type and on
the expected value of the asset conditional on her type. By contrast, our results hold for
general discrete-type environments and do not require such restrictions.
c. A key feature of candidate equilibria of our model is that market makers want to
hedge against the adverse-selection risk or, when they have strictly convex costs, against
the high-demand risk. A strictly convex tariff would perform this role by making high-
cost and, therefore, high-demand types trade at a higher marginal price than low-cost
and, therefore, low-demand types. However, whereas such tariffs naturally arise in the
continuous-type environments of Glosten (1994), Biais et al. (2000), or Back and Baruch
(2013), they are ruled out in our discrete-type environment as any equilibrium must
feature linear pricing. Simpler tariffs such as limit orders then play a key role. We have
shown that in a situation in which all market makers but one post linear tariffs, plac-
ing a well chosen limit order is the optimal way for the remaining market maker to re-
duce his exposure to the adverse-selection and high-demand risks. However, a crucial
finding is that in spite of their popularity, limit orders are consistent with equilibrium
only under exceptional circumstances. This is because the equilibrium price must be
high enough to convince market makers to serve high-cost types. But such a high price
gives each market maker an incentive to serve all the demand emanating from low-cost
types, which is inconsistent with equilibrium unless these types do not want to trade
at that price. This confirms and extends in a radical way earlier results by Attar et al.
(2014), who show in the two-type case that at most one type trades in any pure-strategy
equilibrium of the arbitrary-tariff game. Their result, however, is somehow more general
as they do not require that equilibrium tariffs be convex: this could be relevant for the
analysis of competition on less regulated markets, such as over-the-counter markets, in
which trading is bilateral and fully nonexclusive. It is an open and difficult question to
generalize the results of the present paper to candidate equilibria with nonconvex tar-
iffs of the arbitrary-tariff game when there are more than two types. The main obstacle
is that Property SC-z is no longer necessarily satisfied. As a result, a trade that attracts
some type need not attract all the higher types.
d. In light of our analysis, the strategic foundations of the discriminatory limit-order
book appear problematic: equilibria fail to exist when there are sufficiently many types
with similar preferences, as when we approximate the continuous sets of types postu-
lated by Biais et al. (2000) or Back and Baruch (2013). Given the positive existence results
derived by these authors, the pure-strategy-equilibrium correspondence thus fails to be
lower hemicontinuous when we move from discrete-type models to continuous-type
models. Our analysis admittedly leaves open the possibility that equilibria with convex
tariffs of continuous-type models could be approximated by equilibria with noncon-
vex tariffs of a sequence of discrete-type models. As pointed out above, however, such a
construction is likely to be complex. Moreover, these putative equilibria could not be in-
terpreted as describing the functioning of a discriminatory limit-order book. The search
for strategic foundations seems even more problematic if market makers have strictly
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convex costs, as the market then break downs or an equilibrium fails to exist even under
private values.
9. ε-Equilibria
Requiring an exact strategic foundation for the discriminatory limit-order book may be
asking too much. In this section, we instead focus on approximate equilibria that can
be sustained when we converge to two limiting cases of our model. We first study the
competitive limit obtained when there is a fixed number of types but the number of
market makers goes to infinity. We next study the continuous limit obtained when there
is a fixed number of market makers but the number of types goes to infinity so as to
approximate an interval.
9.1 The competitive limit
A natural candidate for describing the discriminatory limit-order book as a whole is
the competitive tariff proposed by Glosten (1994), preceded by contributions of Jaynes
(1978) and Hellwig (1988). This tariff, to be described below, is by construction entry-
proof.11 However, according to our analysis, it cannot be sustained as an equilibrium
outcome of either the arbitrary-tariff or the convex-tariff game: because each market
maker trading with low-cost insiders is indispensable for providing these types with
their optimal trades along this tariff, he has a profitable deviation.12 A natural question
is how much expected profit he would forego by not playing a best response. The answer
turns out to depend on the market structure, that is, on how many market makers there
are.
To illustrate this point, suppose that the insider has quasilinear utility (Assump-
tion QL-U), with twice differentiable utility functions ui, and that the market makers
have linear costs (Assumption L-v). We consider the pure common-value case where
the cost ci is strictly increasing in the insider’s type i. Analogous to (19), for each i, let
ci ≡ E[cj | j ≥ i] =
∑
j≥i
mjcj
∑
j≥i
mj
be the upper-tail expectation of these costs, conditional on the insider’s type being at
least i. Under quasilinear utility, the Jaynes–Hellwig–Glosten (JHG) allocation is recur-
sively defined by (Q∗0T
∗
0 ) ≡ (00) and
Q∗i ≡ arg max
{
ui(Q)− ciQ :Q ≥Q∗i−1
}
T ∗i ≡ T ∗i−1 + ci
(
Q∗i −Q∗i−1
)
 i = 1     I
11This is shown by Glosten (1994) in a model in which the insider has quasilinear utility and types are
continuously distributed. Attar et al. (2016) provide a simple argument that dispenses with the quasilinear-
ity assumption in the two-type case and Attar et al. (2017) provide a general result for arbitrary distributions
of types under weak conditions on the insider’s preferences.
12We exploited this logic in the proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
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This allocation is well defined, for instance, when the Inada condition limQ→∞ u′i(Q) = 0
is satisfied for all i. The relevant first-order condition for type i is
u′i
(
Q∗i
) ≤ ci with equality if Q∗i > Q∗i−1 (22)
There exists an essentially unique convex tariff implementing the JHG allocation,
namely, the JHG tariff recursively defined by T ∗(0) ≡ 0 and
T ∗(Q)≡ T ∗(Q∗i−1) + ci(Q−Q∗i−1) i = 1     IQ ∈ (Q∗i−1Q∗i ]
The JHG tariff is competitive in the sense that any marginal quantity is priced at the ex-
pected cost of serving the types who purchase it, which can be interpreted as a marginal
version of Akerlof (1970) pricing.
Let us now return to the arbitrary-tariff game, with a finite number K of market
makers. In this context, the JHG tariff can be implemented by letting each market
maker place I limit orders with maximum quantities (Q∗i −Q∗i−1)/K and prices ci, which
amounts to posting the convex tariff T ∗(Kq)/K. However, in this implementation, each
market maker k is indispensable for providing T ∗ in the aggregate and, therefore, has a
profitable deviation. We now identify an upper bound for his expected gain from devi-
ating.
Given that the market makers other than k all post the convex tariff T ∗(Kq)/K, the
resulting aggregate tariff is, according to (2.4), given by
T ∗−k
(
Q−k
) ≡ K − 1
K
T ∗
(
K
K − 1Q
−k
)
 (23)
Market maker k thus faces an insider whose indirect utility from trading (q t) with him
is z∗−ki (q t) ≡ ζ∗−ki (q)− t, where
ζ∗−ki (q) ≡ max
{
ui
(
q+Q−k) − T ∗−k(Q−k) :Q−k ≥ 0} (24)
As T ∗ and, hence, T ∗−k, are convex, Property SC-z is satisfied. It is easy to check from
(23) and (24) and the definition of T ∗ that the functions ζ∗−ki are strictly concave, with
max
{
ζ∗−ki (q)− ciq : q ≥ 0
} = ui(Q∗i ) − K − 1K T ∗i −
1
K
ciQ
∗
i  (25)
where the maximum in (25) is attained for q = Q∗i /K.
To obtain an upper bound for market maker k’s expected gain from deviating, there
is no loss of generality in letting him offer a menu {(qi ti) : i = 0     I} designed so that
each type i selects the trade (qi ti). Because Property SC-z is satisfied, we can assume
that the insider selects a best response in which she purchases nondecreasing quantities
from market maker k, that is, qi ≥ qi−1 for all i. Using a summation by parts, the resulting
expected profit can be rewritten as
∑
i
(∑
j≥i
mj
)[
ti − ti−1 − ci(qi − qi−1)
]

Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) Competitive nonlinear pricing 329
A necessary condition for each type i to trade (qi ti) with market maker k is (7), which,
under quasilinear utility, amounts to
ti − ti−1 ≤ ζ∗−ki (qi)− ζ∗−ki (qi−1) i = 1     I
An upper bound for market maker k’s expected gain from deviating is thus
∑
i
(∑
j≥i
mj
)
max
{
ζ∗−ki (qi−1 + q)− ζ∗−ki (qi−1)− ciq : qi−1 ≥ 0 q ≥ 0
}
≤
∑
i
(∑
j≥i
mj
)
max
{
ζ∗−ki (q)− ζ∗−ki (0)− ciq : q ≥ 0
}
=
∑
i
(∑
j≥i
mj
)[
ui
(
Q∗i
) − K − 1
K
T ∗i −
1
K
ciQ
∗
i − ζ∗−ki (0)
]
≤
∑
i
(∑
j≥i
mj
)[
ui
(
Q∗i
) − ui
(
K − 1
K
Q∗i
)
− 1
K
ciQ
∗
i
]
=
∑
i
(∑
j≥i
mj
){
1
K
[
u′i
(
Q∗i
) − ci]Q∗i − 12K2u
′′
i
(
Q∗i
)(
Q∗i
)2 + o
(
1
K2
)}
≤
∑
i
(∑
j≥i
mj
)[
− 1
2K2
u′′i
(
Q∗i
)(
Q∗i
)2 + o
(
1
K2
)]
=O
(
1
K2
)

where the first inequality follows from the concavity of the functions ζ∗−ki , the first
equality follows from (25), the second inequality follows the fact that each type i can
always trade ((K− 1)Q∗i /K (K− 1)T ∗i /K) with the market makers other than k, the sec-
ond equality follows from a Taylor–Young expansion, and the third inequality follows
from the first-order condition (22). We obtain that in the arbitrary-tariff game with K
market makers, if the market makers other than k post the tariff T ∗(Kq)/K, the maxi-
mum expected gain for market maker k from deviating to another tariff vanishes at rate
1/K2 as K goes to infinity. We can thus rationalize the JHG allocation as an O(1/K2)-
equilibrium outcome of a game with a large number of market makers.
9.2 The continuous limit
In the last section, we examined what happens when we let the number of market mak-
ers grow large, holding the number of types fixed. We now explore the dual scenario
in which we let the number of types grow large, holding the number of market makers
fixed. In the continuous-type case, Biais et al. (2000) show that, under certain assump-
tions on primitives, there exists a symmetric equilibrium of the arbitrary-tariff game in
which all market makers post the same strictly convex tariff. However, according to our
analysis, this tariff is not part of an equilibrium of any discrete-type version of this game:
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because each market maker wants to make the insider’s downward local constraints
bind, he has a profitable deviation. A natural question is how much profits he would
forego by not playing a best response. The answer turns out to depend on the richness
of the set of types, that is, on how closely it approximates an interval.
To illustrate this point, it is useful to first recall how Biais et al. (2000) proceed to
solve the arbitrary-tariff game. Let the insider’s type θ be distributed over a bounded
interval [θθ] according to a distribution F with strictly positive density f . Type θ’s utility
function is U(QTθ) ≡ u(Qθ) − T and the market makers’ cost of serving type θ is
c(θ).13 Now select a market maker k and suppose that all the other market makers post
the same strictly convex tariff t. Then the resulting aggregate tariff is, according to (2.4),
given by
T−k
(
Q−k
) ≡ (K − 1)t
(
1
K − 1Q
−k
)
 (26)
Market maker k thus faces an insider whose indirect utility from trading (q t) with him
is z−k(q t θ)≡ ζ−k(qθ)− t, where
ζ−k(qθ)≡ max{u(q+Q−kθ) − T−k(Q−k) :Q−k ≥ 0} (27)
As t and, hence, T−k, are strictly convex, the family of functions ζ−k(· θ) satisfies the
strict single-crossing property. Characterizing market maker k’s best response in the
arbitrary-tariff game then reduces to a standard screening problem, namely, that of find-
ing a menu of trades {(χ(θ) τ(θ)) : θ ∈ [θθ]} that maximizes his expected profit
∫ θ
θ
[
τ(θ)− c(θ)χ(θ)]f (θ)dθ
subject to the incentive-compatibility constraints
ζ−k
(
χ(θ)θ
) − τ(θ)≥ ζ−k(χ(θ′) θ) − τ(θ′) (θθ′) ∈ [θθ] × [θθ]
and the participation constraints
ζ−k
(
χ(θ)θ
) − τ(θ)≥ ζ−k(0 θ) θ ∈ [θθ]
Using standard techniques, we obtain that characterizing market maker k’s best re-
sponse in the continuous-type arbitrary-tariff game amounts to maximizing
∫ θ
θ
[
ζ−k
(
χ(θ)θ
) − c(θ)χ(θ)− 1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
∂ζ−k
∂θ
(
χ(θ)θ
)]
f (θ)dθ− ζ−k(0 θ) (28)
over all nondecreasing quantity schedules χ. Biais et al. (2000) provide assumptions
on primitives that guarantee the existence of a strictly convex tariff t∗ that induces in-
direct utility functions ζ∗−k as in (26) and (27) for t ≡ t∗, and is such that the solution
13Biais et al. (2000) more specifically suppose u(Qθ) ≡ θQ − (ασ2/2)Q2. We stick to a general notation
for the sake of clarity.
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χ∗ to the problem of maximizing (28) for ζ−k ≡ ζ∗−k is continuous and implementable
by t∗. Therefore, under these assumptions, there exists a symmetric equilibrium of the
arbitrary-tariff game in which all market makers post the tariff t∗.
We can approximate this construction in our discrete-type setting. Let us choose I
discrete types in [θθ], regularly spaced for simplicity,
θi ≡ θ+ i
I
(θ− θ) i = 1     I
with strictly positive probabilities
mi ≡ F(θi)− F(θi−1) i = 1     I
with θ0 ≡ θ by convention. Suppose that all the market makers other than k post the tar-
iff t∗, so that type θi’s indirect utility function is ζ∗−k(· θi). Again using standard tech-
niques, we obtain that characterizing market maker k’s best response in the discrete-
type arbitrary-tariff game with I types amounts to maximizing
∗I (χ)
≡
I∑
i=1
mi
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
ζ∗−k
(
χ(θi) θi
) − c(θi)χ(θi)−
∑
j>i
mj
mi
[
ζ∗−k
(
χ(θi) θi+1
) − ζ∗−k(χ(θi) θi)]
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
− ζ∗−k(0 θ) (29)
over all nondecreasing quantity schedules χ. Compared to
∗(χ) ≡
∫ θ
θ
[
ζ∗−k
(
χ(θ)θ
) − c(θ)χ(θ)− 1 − F(θ)
f (θ)
∂ζ∗−k
∂θ
(
χ(θ)θ
)]
f (θ)dθ
− ζ∗−k(0 θ) (30)
which is (28) for ζ−k ≡ ζ∗−k, the constant of integration in (29) is the same and the sum
in (29) is shown to approximate the integral in (30) thanks to the equalities
mi = θ− θ
I
f (θi)+O
(
1
I2
)
(31)
∑
j>i
mj = 1 − F(θi) (32)
ζ∗−k
(
χ(θi) θi+1
) − ζ∗−k(χ(θi) θi)
= θ− θ
I
∂ζ∗−k
∂θ
(
χ(θi) θi
) +O
(
1
I2
)
 i = 1     I (33)
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The sum in (29) then equals
θ− θ
I
I∑
i=1
[
ζ∗−k
(
χ(θi) θi
)− c(θi)χ(θi)− 1 − F(θi)
f (θi)
∂ζ∗−k
∂θ
(
χ(θi) θi
)]
f (θi)+O
(
1
I
)
 (34)
which, under suitable regularity conditions, is the Riemann approximation, with preci-
sion O(1/I), of the integral in (30). These conditions, in turn, imply that this approx-
imation is uniform in χ as long as we focus on nondecreasing quantity schedules in a
uniformly bounded set X , which involves no loss of generality; we refer to the Supple-
mental Material for the required argument. As a result, we have
sup
{∣∣∗(χ)−∗I (χ)∣∣ : χ ∈X} ≤O
(
1
I
)
 (35)
Now let χ∗I be a nondecreasing quantity schedule that maximizes (29). Because χ
∗ is
the quantity schedule implemented by the equilibrium tariff t∗ in the continuous-type
arbitrary-tariff game, we have
∗
(
χ∗
) ≥∗(χ∗I) I ≥ 1 (36)
Both χ∗ and χ∗I belong to X . According to (35) and (36), this implies
∗I
(
χ∗
) +O
(
1
I
)
≥∗I
(
χ∗I
) = max{∗I (χ) : χ ∈X}
We obtain that in the discrete-type arbitrary-tariff game with I types, if all the market
makers other than k post the tariff t∗, the maximum expected gain for market maker k
from deviating to another tariff vanishes at rate 1/I as I goes to infinity. We can thus
rationalize the Biais et al. (2000) aggregate allocation as an O(1/I)-equilibrium outcome
of a game with a large but finite number of types. Interestingly, this finding is consis-
tent with our analysis of the competitive limit in Section 9.1; indeed, as shown by Biais
et al. (2000, Proposition 14), in the continuous-type case, the aggregate equilibrium tariff
converges to the JHG tariff when the number of market makers goes to infinity.
10. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the impact of adverse selection on trade when uninformed
market makers compete in tariffs to serve an insider whose private information has an
arbitrary discrete distribution. Our results strikingly differ from those obtained assum-
ing continuous distributions for the insider’s private information. Indeed, pure-strategy
equilibria in our model feature linear pricing, whereas the market makers’ ability to re-
strict the quantities they offer at the equilibrium price, using familiar instruments such
as limit orders, leads to an extreme form of market breakdown. An implication of our
analysis is that pure-strategy equilibria fail to exist in sufficiently fine discretizations of
existing continuous-type models, for which pure-strategy equilibria with strictly convex
tariffs are known to exist under parametric assumptions on preferences and informa-
tion. This tension can be relaxed by considering ε-equilibria of discrete-type models
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with a large number of market makers or with a large number of types, leading to the
Glosten (1994) allocation and to the Biais et al. (2000) allocation, respectively.
The possibility of precisely targeting types in any discrete-type model and, con-
versely, the impossibility of doing so in constructed equilibria of continuous-type mod-
els, is crucial to understand why the equilibrium correspondence fails to be lower hemi-
continuous when we approximate the latter by the former. In any discrete-type model,
no market maker can be indispensable in equilibrium; otherwise, he would have an in-
centive to raise his tariff. Key to this logic is that in candidate equilibria, market makers
place non-infinitesimal limit orders to serve a finite number of types. By contrast, in
continuous-type models, each market maker is indispensable in equilibrium, yet he has
no incentive to raise his tariff. The reason is that in constructed equilibria with strictly
convex tariffs, the other market makers place infinitesimal limit orders that act as ar-
bitrarily close substitutes. Which model is more appropriate thus hinges on whether
we deem targeting reasonable. In principle, targeting is possible unless a market maker
who is issuing a limit order believes that this order can be partially executed to any level
up to the maximal quantity. In light of our results, however, it could be argued that,
in practice, the expected gains from precisely targeting types are negligible if there are
many market makers or many types. We may then consider ε-equilibria as a reasonable
description of the functioning of the limit-order book.
An alternative and promising avenue of research would be to characterize mixed-
strategy equilibria of the discrete-type model, the existence of which is guaranteed ac-
cording to known results by Carmona and Fajardo (2009). Preliminary investigations of
the two-type case have lead to a robust example of a mixed-strategy equilibrium that
exists when the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure-strategy
equilibrium are not satisfied. Targeting is now impossible because of the strategic un-
certainty faced by each market maker regarding the tariffs offered by his competitors.
Interestingly, this equilibrium features zero expected profits for the market makers. This
contrasts with the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand–Edgeworth oligopoly described
by Allen and Hellwig (1986). Besides, this equilibrium bears no apparent relationship
with available equilibrium candidates. The Glosten (1994) competitive allocation, in
particular, does not emerge when the number of market makers grows large. These find-
ings suggest that further investigations of mixed-strategy equilibria are in order to reach
a fuller understanding of the consequences of adverse selection for the functioning of
competitive markets.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. As a preliminary remark, observe that if (t1     tK s) is an
equilibrium with nondecreasing individual quantities of the convex-tariff game, then,
by Lemma 3, each market maker k must earn an expected profit V kco(t
−k) and his equi-
librium tariff tk must be a solution to the problem (11) that defines V kco(t
−k). As shown
in Step 1 of the proof of Lemma 3 in the Supplemental Material, tk must then be of the
form tpq and, in particular, must be piecewise linear. The proof consists of four steps.
Step 1. The result is immediate if there is no trade in equilibrium. Thus suppose
that trade takes place in equilibrium and let p ≡ ∂−T(QI). Any market maker k could
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truncate his tariff at sk(p). A best response for the insider consists of purchasing qki
or sk(p) from market maker k depending on whether u′i(Qi) < p or u
′
i(Qi) ≥ p, overall
preserving nondecreasing quantities. We can thus apply Lemma 3 to obtain
∑
{i:u′i(Qi)≥p}
mi(p− ci)
[
qki − sk(p)
] ≥ 0 k= 1    K (37)
Any market maker k could also attract all trades at marginal price p by deviating to a
tariff coinciding with tk up to sk(p) and offering to sell any quantity between sk(p) and
sk(p)+ S(p)− S(p) at marginal price p. A best response for the insider consists of pur-
chasing qki or s
k(p)+Qi − S(p) from market maker k depending on whether u′i(Qi) < p
or u′i(Qi) ≥ p, overall preserving nondecreasing quantities. We can thus apply Lemma 3
to obtain
∑
{i:u′i(Qi)≥p}
mi(p− ci)
[
Qi − S(p)
] ≤ ∑
{i:u′i(Qi)≥p}
mi(p− ci)
[
qki − sk(p)
]
 k= 1    K
Summing these inequalities over k in turn yields
∑
{i:u′i(Qi)≥p}
mi(p− ci)
[
Qi − S(p)
] ≤ 0
as K > 1, which, given (37), implies
∑
{i:u′i(Qi)≥p}
mi(p− ci)
[
qki − sk(p)
] = 0 k= 1    K (38)
Hence each market maker k makes zero expected profit on trades in excess of sk(p)
taking place at marginal price p.
Step 2. Now suppose, to the contrary, that trade also takes place at a marginal price
strictly less than p and let p′ be the highest such price. That is, sk(p′) = sk(p) for all
k, p′ ≡ ∂−T(S(p′)), and S(p) = S(p′) > S(p′). We claim that type j ≡ min{i : Qi ≥ S(p′)}
has a unique best response that consists of purchasing sk(p′) from each market maker
k, thus exactly exhausting aggregate supply S(p′) at marginal price p′. By definition of
j, Qj−1 < S(p′), with Q0 = 0 by convention, qkj−1 ≤ s(p′) ≤ qkj for all k, with qk0 = 0 for
all k by convention, and qkj−1 < s(p
′) for at least one k. To prove the claim, we show
that pj = p′, where pj is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the solution of (2); see
Step 0 of the proof of Lemma 3 in the Supplemental Material. Notice first that pj ≥ p′ as
Qj ≥ S(p′). Suppose then that pj > p′ and fix a k such that qkj−1 < sk(p′). Then market
maker k could deviate to a tariff coinciding with tk up to qkj−1 and offering to sell any
quantity between qkj−1 and q
k
j at marginal price pj , as well as any quantity between q
k
j
and qkI at marginal price p. A best response for the insider consists of purchasing the
same quantities qki from market maker k as when he posts the tariff t
k, overall preserv-
ing nondecreasing quantities and yielding him a strictly higher expected profit than his
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equilibrium expected profit. We can then apply Lemma 3 to obtain a contradiction. The
claim follows.
Step 3. Defining j as in Step 2, observe that, by (38), we have
∑
i≥j
mi(p− ci)
[
qki − sk(p)
] = 0 k = 1    K (39)
because qki = sk(p′)= sk(p) for all k and i ≥ j such that u′i(Qi) < p. Now as Qj−1 < S(p′),
there exists a market maker k such that
qk ≡ max{sk(p′) qkj−1} < sk(p′)
According to Step 2, type j has a unique best response, in which she purchases sk(p′)
from market maker k. Hence z−kj (s
k(p′) tk(sk(p′))) > max{z−kj (q tk(q)) : q ≤ qk}, so
that, by continuity, there exists some strictly positive ε such that
z−kj
(
sk
(
p′
)
 tk
(
sk
(
p′
)) + ε[sk(p′) − qk]) > z−kj (q tk(q)) q ≤ qk (40)
Let us then fix an arbitrary
qk ∈ arg max{z−kj (q tk(qk) + (p′ + ε)(q− qk)) : q ∈ [qk sk(p′)]} (41)
As tk(sk(p′)) = tk(qk) + p′[sk(p′) − qk], (40) and (41) imply qk > qk. Market maker k
could thus deviate to a tariff coinciding with tk up to qk and offering to sell any quantity
between qk and qk at marginal price p′ + ε. A best response for the insider consists of
purchasing qki or q
k from market maker k depending on whether i < j or i ≥ j, overall
preserving nondecreasing quantities. We can thus apply Lemma 3 to obtain
∑
i≥j
mi
(
p′ + ε− ci
)(
qk − qk) ≤ ∑
i≥j
mi
{(
p′ − ci
)[
sk
(
p′
) − qk] + (p− ci)[qki − sk(p)]}
=
∑
i≥j
mi
(
p′ − ci
)[
sk
(
p′
) − qk]
where the equality follows from (39). Rearranging, we obtain
∑
i≥j
mi
(
p′ − ci
)[
sk
(
p′
) − qk] ≥ ∑
i≥j
miε
(
qk − qk)> 0
because qk > qk. As sk(p′)≥ qk by (41), we thus have shown
∑
i≥j
mi
(
p′ − ci
)
> 0 (42)
Finally, any market maker k could also attract all trades at marginal price p′ by deviating
to a tariff coinciding with tk up to sk(p) and offering to sell any quantity between sk(p′)
and sk(p′) + S(p′) − S(p′) at marginal price p′. A best response for the insider consists
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of purchasing qki or s
k(p′) + S(p′) − S(p′) from market maker k depending on whether
i < j or i ≥ j, overall preserving nondecreasing quantities. We can thus apply Lemma 3
to obtain ∑
i≥j
mi
(
p′ − ci
)[
S
(
p′
) − S(p′)]
≤
∑
i≥j
mi
(
p′ − ci
)[
sk
(
p′
) − sk(p′)] + ∑
i≥j
mi(p− ci)
[
qki − sk(p)
]

=
∑
i≥j
mi
(
p′ − ci
)[
sk
(
p′
) − sk(p′)] k= 1    K
again taking advantage of (39). Summing these inequalities over k in turn yields∑
i≥j
mi
(
p′ − ci
)[
S
(
p′
) − S(p′)] ≤ 0
as K > 1, which, given S(p′) > S(p′), contradicts (42). It follows that no trade can take
place at a marginal price strictly less than p.
Step 4. From Step 3, all trades must take place at price p and the insider faces an
aggregate tariff T that is linear with slope p up to S(p). To complete the proof, suppose,
to the contrary, that S(p) > 0 and Qi = S(p) for some type i who thus exactly exhausts
aggregate supply S(p) at price p; denote by j the lowest such type. Then at least one
market maker k must be indispensable for type j to reach her equilibrium utility. Argu-
ing as in Step 3, market maker k could slightly raise the price p on an interval [qkqk],
thereby earning a strictly positive expected profit, in contradiction to (38). Hence the
result.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof has two parts.
Necessity. We first show that conditions (20) are necessary for an equilibrium with con-
vex tariffs. The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1. Observe first that according to Proposition 5, we can with no loss of generality
focus on an equilibrium with nondecreasing individual quantities. Let us then fix such
an equilibrium and let p be the equilibrium price, which must belong to ∂cI(DI(p)/K)
by Theorems 1 and 2. For each k, let S
−k
(p) ≡ S(p) − sk(p) be the aggregate supply at
price p of the market makers other than k. Now suppose S(p) > 0 and DI(p) ≥ qkI +
S
−k
(p) for all k. Summing these inequalities over k, we obtain DI(p) ≥ S(p) > 0 as
K > 1, which contradicts the final statements of Propositions 1 and 2. Hence, if S(p) > 0,
there exists k such that
DI(p)− qkI < S
−k
(p)
Moreover, because the equilibrium has nondecreasing individual quantities and be-
cause each type i purchases Di(p) in the aggregate, we have, for each i,
Di(p)− qki =
∑
l 
=k
qli ≤
∑
l 
=k
qlI =DI(p)− qkI 
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Therefore, we have shown that if S(p) > 0, there exists k and some strictly positive ε
such that, for each i,
Di(p)− qki + ε ≤ S
−k
(p) (43)
Step 2. Now, suppose, to the contrary, that ci(p) < τi(00) for some type i < i∗. Any
market maker k could deviate by placing a limit order with price p′ ∈ (ci(p) τi(00))
and maximum quantity q for some small q, together with a limit order with price p and
maximum quantity max{qkI − q0}. This offer is a pair of limit orders and, therefore, is
equivalent to a convex tariff. According to Lemmas 2 and 3, market maker k can break
ties in his favor as long as he sticks to nondecreasing quantities. For q small enough, the
first limit order attracts type i as well as types j > i by Property SC-z, and any such type
exactly purchases q along this limit order. We now evaluate the contribution of each type
to market maker k’s expected profit following his deviation.
Consider first types j = i     i∗ − 1. By construction, they purchase q at price p′
from market maker k. Moreover, they do not want to make additional trades at price p:
indeed, by Property P, their marginal rate of substitution computed at their final trade
(qp′q) along the first limit order is at most equal to τi(00), which is itself at most equal
to p. Hence their contribution to market maker k’s expected profit is
∑
i∗>j≥i
mj
[
p′q− cj(q)
] = ∑
i∗>j≥i
mj
[
p′ − ∂+cj(0)
]
q+ o(q) (44)
for q small enough.
Consider next types j < i. They may also be willing to purchase positive quantities at
price p′—though not at price p—from market maker k, but unlike for types j = i     i∗−
1, we cannot precisely estimate these purchases. However, Assumption SC-v implies
that for any such type, we have p′ > ci(p)≥ ∂+cj(0). Hence, their contribution to market
maker k’s expected profit is nonnegative for q small enough.
Consider finally types j ≥ i∗. By Assumption I-U , once they have purchased q at
price p′ from market maker k, their new demands at price p are finite. Two cases may
arise. If S(p) = 0, then, by Theorems 1 and 2, for all these types Dj(p) = 0 and thus
τj(00) ≤ p; hence, by Property P again, they do not want to make additional trades at
price p. If S(p) > 0, then by Berge’s maximum theorem (Aliprantis and Border 2006,
Theorem 17.31), we can choose q small enough so that their new demands at price p are
within ε of Dj(p), and, by Step 1, we can select k such that (43) holds. A best response for
types j ≥ i∗ then consists of purchasing max{qkj q} from market maker k, overall preserv-
ing nondecreasing quantities; indeed, by (43), the market makers other than k supply an
aggregate quantity S
−k
(p) that is high enough to cover the rest of their new demands at
price p. Hence, their contribution to market maker k’s expected profit is
∑
j≥i∗
mj
[
p′q+pmax{qkj − q0} − cj(max{qkj q})]
or, equivalently,
vk + (p′ −p) ∑
j≥i∗
mjq+
∑
j≥i∗
mj
{
p
[
max
{
qkj q
} − qkj ] − [cj(max{qkj q}) − cj(qkj )]} (45)
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where vk is the equilibrium expected profit of market maker k:
vk ≡
∑
j≥i∗
mj
[
pqkj − cj
(
qkj
)]

We now give a lower bound for the last term of (45). For each j, select γj ∈ ∂cj(max{qkj q}).
Because qkj is nondecreasing in j, we can assume that γj is nondecreasing in j. Then
∑
j≥i∗
mj
{
p
[
max
{
qkj q
} − qkj ] − [cj(max{qkj q}) − cj(qkj )]}
≥
∑
j≥i∗
mj(p− γj)max
{
q− qkj 0
}
≥
(∑
j≥i∗
mj
)−1(∑
j≥i∗
mj(p− γj)
)(∑
j≥i∗
mj max
{
q− qkj 0
})
 (46)
where the first inequality follows from the convexity of cj and the second inequality
follows from Chebyshev’s sum inequality (Hardy et al. 1934, Chapter II, Section 17),
taking advantage of the fact that γj and qkj are nondecreasing in j. In the linear-cost
case, p = cI = γj in equilibrium, so that the right-hand side of (46) is zero. In the
convex-cost case, i∗ = I, and two cases may arise: Either qkI > 0, so then the right-
hand side of (46) is zero for q small enough, or qkI = 0, so that p ≥ ∂c+(0). Then
(p − γI)q ≥ [∂c+(0) − ∂c−(q)]q = o(q) for q small enough. In any case, we obtain from
(45) that the contribution of types j ≥ i∗ to market maker k’s expected profit is at least
vk + (p′ −p) ∑
j≥i∗
mjq+ o(q) (47)
for q small enough.
To conclude, summing (44) and (47) and taking advantage of (19) yields that market
maker k’s expected profit from deviating is at least
vk + [p′ − ci(p)]∑
j≥i
mjq+ o(q)
which is strictly higher than vk for q small enough as p′ > ci(p). This shows that condi-
tions (20) are necessary for an equilibrium with convex tariffs.
Sufficiency. We next show that conditions (20) are sufficient for an equilibrium in which
each market maker posts the linear tariff (21). As a preliminary remark, observe that for
each k, the family of functions z−ki satisfies Property SC-z. Hence, we can assume that
the insider purchases nondecreasing quantities from market maker k following any de-
viation on his part. Focusing on the insider’s downward local constraints (7), we obtain
that market maker k’s expected profit from deviating is bounded above by V k(t−k), as
defined by (8). There remains to show that V k(t−k) cannot exceed the expected profit
vk earned by market maker k in the candidate equilibrium. The proof consists of three
steps.
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Step 1. We first show that in computing V k(t−k), we can with no loss of general-
ity focus on menus with nonnegative transfers. Indeed, let μ ≡ {(qi ti) : i = 0     I} be
a menu that satisfies all the constraints in the problem (8) that defines V k(t−k) and is
such that at least one type makes a strictly negative transfer; denote by i the lowest such
type. We can then build a new menu μ′ that differs from μ only in allocating (qi−1 ti−1)
to type i. We claim that μ′ satisfies all the constraints in (8). First, because μ has non-
decreasing quantities, so does μ′. Second, the downward local constraint of type i is
now an identity. Third, the downward local constraint of type i + 1, if such a type ex-
ists, now is written as z−ki+1(qi+1 ti+1) ≥ z−ki+1(qi−1 ti−1), which holds by Property SC-z as
μ satisfies qi ≥ qi−1, z−ki+1(qi+1 ti+1) ≥ z−ki+1(qi ti), and z−ki (qi ti) ≥ z−ki (qi−1 ti−1). Thus
μ′ satisfies all the constraints in (8), as claimed. The resulting variation in market maker
k’s expected profit is
[
ti−1 − ci(qi−1)
] − [ti − ci(qi)] = ti−1 − ti + ci(qi)− ci(qi−1)
up to multiplication by mi, and is strictly positive because qi ≥ qi−1 and ti−1 ≥ 0 > ti by
definition of i. It follows that μ cannot be a solution to (8).
Step 2. Given the equilibrium strategies specified in Theorem 3, following a deviation
by market maker k, each type i can, in addition to (qi ti), purchase some quantity Q
−k
i ≤
Di(p) at price p from market makers other than k. Notice that we must have Ui(qi ti)≥
Ui(00), for, otherwise, type i would be strictly better off not trading with market maker
k and purchasing her demand Di(p) at price p from market makers other than k. Now
using the convexity of cost functions, market maker k’s expected profit from offering a
menu satisfying the constraints in (8) can be bounded above as
∑
i
mi
[
ti − ci(qi)
] ≤ ∑
i∗>i
mi
[
ti − ∂+ci(0)qi
] + ∑
i≥i∗
mi(ti −pqi)+
∑
i≥i∗
mi
[
pqi − ci(qi)
]
 (48)
Because, in the candidate equilibrium, each market maker sells an element of his com-
petitive supply at price p to types i ≥ i∗, the third term on the right-hand side of (48) is
bounded above by the candidate-equilibrium expected profit:
∑
i≥i∗
mi
[
pqi − ci(qi)
] ≤ vk (49)
As for the two remaining terms, a summation by parts, taking advantage of (19), yields
∑
i∗>i
mi
[
ti − ∂+ci(0)qi
] + ∑
i≥i∗
mi(ti −pqi)=
∑
i
(∑
j≥i
mj
)[
ti − ti−1 − ci(p)(qi − qi−1)
]
 (50)
In light of (48)–(50), we only need to check that
ti − ti−1 ≤ ci(p)(qi − qi−1) i = 1     I (51)
We turn to this task in the last step of the proof.
Step 3. Consider first any type i < i∗. If i > 1, we know that Ui−1(qi−1 ti−1) ≥
Ui−1(00); therefore, by Assumption SC-U , we obtain Ui(qi−1 ti−1) ≥ Ui(00), which
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also trivially holds when i = 1. We also know from Step 1 that ti−1 is nonnegative; there-
fore, by Property P and condition (20), we obtain τi(qi−1 ti−1) ≤ ci(p). Notice also that
ci(p) ≤ p as ∂+cj(0) ≤ p ∈ ∂cI(DI(p)/K) for all j < i∗ by Assumption SC-v. Hence, for
type i to agree to trade (qi − qi−1 ti − ti−1) and (Q−ki pQ−ki ) on top of (qi−1 ti−1), (51)
must hold.
Consider next any type i ≥ i∗ for which ci(p) = p by (19). Two cases may arise: Either
qi −qi−1 ≤Di(p), so then (51) follows from the fact that the quantity qi −qi−1 is supplied
at price p by the market makers other than k, or qi − qi−1 > Di(p). We then need the
following generalization of Property P, the proof of which follows along the same lines.
Property P′ . For all i, Q ≤Q′, and T ′ ≥ T ≥ 0,
Ui
(
Q′T ′
) ≥Ui(QT) implies τi(Q′T ′) ≤ τi(QT)
Now suppose, to the contrary, that qi − qi−1 >Di(p) and (51) does not hold, so that
ti − ti−1 >p(qi − qi−1). We must have
Ui
(
qi−1 +Di(p) ti−1 +pDi(p)
) ≥Ui(Di(p)pDi(p)) (52)
and
τi
(
qi−1 +Di(p) ti−1 +pDi(p)
)
>p (53)
for, otherwise, type i would not agree to trade (qi − qi−1 −Di(p) ti − ti−1 −pDi(p)) and
(Q−ki pQ
−k
i ) on top of (qi−1 +Di(p) ti−1 +pDi(p)). However, because ti−1 is nonnega-
tive by Step 1, Property P′ and (52) imply
τi
(
qi−1 +Di(p) ti−1 +pDi(p)
) ≤ τi(Di(p)pDi(p)) ≤ p
which contradicts (53). Hence the result.
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